Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County in cases of In Re: Appeal of Leonard Marx from Triennial Assessment 1969-1970-1971 on property Designated as Block 1-H-244, Second Ward, City of Pittsburgh, v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, No. GD 75-4376; and In Re: Appeal of Leonard Marx from Triennial Assessment 1975-1976-1977 on Property Designated as Block 1-H-244, Second Ward, City of Pittsburgh, v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, No. GD 75-4389.
D. R. Pellegrini, Assistant City Solicitor, with him Mead J. Mulvihill, Jr., City Solicitor, for appellant.
Robert A. Jarvis, with him Thomas F. Lamb, Raymond W. Cromer, and Beck, McGinnis & Jarvis, for appellee.
William J. Fahey, for Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review.
President Judge Bowman and Judges Crumlish, Jr., Kramer, Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer, Rogers and Blatt. Judge Kramer did not participate in the decision. Opinion by Judge Crumlish, Jr. Judge Kramer did not participate in the decision in this case.
[ 31 Pa. Commw. Page 497]
The City of Pittsburgh (Appellant) appeals the decision of the court of common pleas which reduced the assessed value of certain property owned by Leonard
[ 31 Pa. Commw. Page 498]
Marx (Appellee) designated as block 1-h-244, Second Ward, City of Pittsburgh. The property was assessed by the Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment at $315,000*fn1 for the years 1972 through 1977. The court below reduced this assessment to $155,000 for 1972, 1973 and 1974 and to $160,000 for the years 1975, 1976 and 1977.
Appellant essentially asserts that the decision below is not supported by competent evidence because Appellee's expert witnesses did not fully or correctly utilize the capitalization of income method to determine the market value of the subject property. Appellee asserts that the decision is supported by competent evidence, and has also made a motion to quash this appeal alleging that Appellant lacked the proper standing to appeal and that its intervention in the proceedings below was improper.*fn2
We find no merit in Appellee's motion to quash. Appellant's clear right to appeal is set forth by Section 520 of the Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 853, as amended, 72 P.S. § 5020-520, which states:
The corporate authorities of any county, city, borough, town, township, school district or poor district, which may feel aggrieved by any assessment of any property or other subject of taxation for its corporate purposes, shall have the right to appeal therefrom in the same manner . . ...