they are not objecting to any federal agency action, the exhaustion requirement of § 2000d-2 is inapplicable to them. In addition plaintiffs argue that the issues involved in this action are legal and are not addressed to a particular area of administrative expertise and that exhaustion, therefore, is not necessary.
We conclude that plaintiffs' theory of exhaustion under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d is too restrictive. Although an exhaustion requirement arises directly from § 2000d-2, we find that exhaustion may be implied as a prerequisite to any action pursuant to § 2000d et seq. because of the enforcement policies implicit in Title VI. As the court stated in Johnson v. County of Chester, 413 F. Supp. 1299, 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1976), "[the] scheme of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [ 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. ] is essentially administrative." The statute intends that the federal agency involved in the allocation of funds "attempt at the outset to secure compliance by voluntary means, if such method is reasonably possible." Adams v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636, 641 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 156 U.S. App. D.C. 267, 480 F.2d 1159 (1973).
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare controls the distribution of federal funds to YSC. In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, HEW has promulgated an extensive regulatory scheme to ensure compliance with Title VI for any federal financing for which it is responsible. 45 C.F.R. § 80. In particular, 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.7-80.10 establish procedures for filing a complaint by any person or class who believes that they have been discriminated against, for investigating such complaint and for ensuring compliance with § 2000d.
In light of this administrative procedure, we conclude that plaintiffs have a duty to exhaust their administrative remedies or plead sufficient facts to support the contention that such exhaustion would be ineffective or futile. Plaintiffs apparently have not contacted the federal agency involved and have not sufficiently alleged facts to justify an exception to the exhaustion requirement. Therefore, plaintiffs' § 2000d claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
XII. RIGHT OF PRIVACY:
Defendants maintain that residents of YSC have no right of privacy. In particular, defendants argue that plaintiffs have no fourth amendment rights once confined at YSC. Without specifying the limits of plaintiffs' fourth amendment protection, we must disagree with defendants' assertion.
In Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1315, 1317 (7th Cir. 1975), now Justice Stevens, speaking for the Seventh Circuit, held that prisoners do retain some measure of fourth amendment protection. Juveniles, some of whom have not even been adjudicated delinquent, a fortiori retain certain fourth amendment protections. Defendants have not presented any justification for terminating all fourth amendment protections for YSC residents and therefore we reject the proposition that these juveniles must lose all expectations of privacy once confined.
XIII. PENDENT STATE LAW CLAIMS:
Defendants argue that this court should not exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims of plaintiffs. Given our decision to retain the federal constitutional claims, we find that the federal and state law claims arise "from a common nucleus of operative fact" so that they may be tried conveniently and economically in one forum. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966). Therefore we will retain jurisdiction over the state law claims.
JOSEPH S. LORD, III, CH. J.