crew on vessels it owned and operated; (5) the defendant had a separate agreement with Local 14599 of the United Steelworkers of America for masters, engineers and pilots of its vessels; (6) the plaintiff worked on an hourly shift and lived full time at his home; (7) the SB-40 had no power and according to the plaintiff's deposition at page 16, it had been in the same position for about three months having repair work done on it part time; and (8) the plaintiff was assigned as a welder on the day of the accident to the lower landing where new storage bins were to be placed in the SB-40.
Based on these facts and the three pronged test in Griffith, supra, the plaintiff is not a seaman. An individual is a seaman under the Jones Act if (1) the ship is in navigation; (2) there is more or less a permanent connection with the ship and (3) the worker be aboard primarily to aid in navigation. Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. et al., supra; Specht v. Pittsburgh Coal Company et al., supra. All three criteria must be met for the plaintiff to bring an action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688. Here, the facts make it obvious that the plaintiff was neither more or less permanently connected with the SB-40 nor was he aboard primarily to aid in navigation. In Specht, supra, the plaintiff was classified as a repairman, and had only a temporary relationship with the vessel. Here the plaintiff as a welder was only connected to the SB-40 when his work detail was such that he was ordered to complete repairs. It was only temporary if there is a connection at all. In Specht, the plaintiff was not found to be aiding in the vessel's navigation while he removed its rubber stripping. Likewise here, the plaintiff while cutting out and replacing compartments in the SB-40 would not be aiding in its navigation.
Whether or not the SB-40 was "in navigation" need not be decided as in Specht, because it is not essential for a seaman determination when the two other criteria are not met. As a matter of law, I conclude that the plaintiff Chapman was not a seaman at the time of his injury.
The plaintiff's claim that the defendant owed him the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is negated by the fact that the SB-40 was docked and undergoing extensive repair and as such was not in navigation requiring seaworthy status. But even if the plaintiff were entitled to a warranty of seaworthiness, he would have had to be doing work which was traditionally done by a seaman. Cutting out and replacing metal compartments in a barge while it is docked is not work traditionally done by a seaman. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872, 90 L. Ed. 1099 (1946); Rao v. Hillman Barge and Construction Co., 467 F.2d 1276, C.A. 3, 1972; Specht, supra.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff on his Jones Act and seaworthiness claims will be granted for the reason that there exists no genuine issue of material fact.