conspired to establish an interlocking business network which was intended from the outset to defraud subcontractors by undercapitalizing the general contractor (Anvan-Pa.) and by using the business network to shield the defendants from liability to subcontractors.
Assuming the allegations of the complaint to be true for purposes of the motion before us, Melo-Sonics Corp. v. Cropp, 342 F.2d 856, 858-859 (3d Cir. 1965), we find that the contacts between Anvan Co. and its partners with this Commonwealth are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process of law. The alleged contacts are numerous, continuous and of a substantial quality. The contacts are alleged to be purposeful acts by which the defendants availed themselves of the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum. Furthermore, the Commonwealth has a strong interest in preventing nonresidents from committing tortious acts of this nature within its borders. The motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction over Anvan Co. and the individual defendants in their partnership capacities will, therefore, be denied.
The application of the relevant due process standards to the individuals in their personal capacities is more difficult. The greater portion of the alleged conspiratorial activities was conducted by the defendants in their partnership and/or corporate capacities. However, reading the complaint in a light most favorable to Vespe, it is possible to infer that the individual defendants, in their personal capacities, masterminded the scheme to establish the business network by which they intended to defraud the subcontractors and, further, that at least some of the overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were committed in Pennsylvania by the individuals acting as individuals.
Whether or not any acts were actually committed by the individuals qua individuals in Pennsylvania and, if so, whether those acts come within the statutory provisions of § 8303 or satisfy the due process of law requirements, is impossible to discern conclusively from the allegations of the complaint before us. We find, however, that Vespe made allegations which are sufficient to overcome defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction.
Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) will, therefore, be denied.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 433 F. Supp.]
AND NOW, TO WIT, this 23th day of May, 1977, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. The motions of defendants Anvan Corporation (Pennsylvania), and of Anvan Corporation (Illinois) and Anarca to stay proceedings pending arbitration are hereby denied.
2. The motions of defendants Anvan Company, Anthony Antoniou, Irene Antoniou and Michael Kahles, individually and as co-partners trading as Anvan Company, to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for insufficient service of process pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) and (5), respectively, are denied. The alternative motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration is denied.
3. Vespe Contracting Company and Anvan Corporation (Pennsylvania) shall proceed to arbitration on Count I of the complaint in accordance with Vespe Contracting Co. v. Anvan Corp., 399 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.Pa. 1975).
4. Vespe Contracting Company, Anvan Corporation (Pennsylvania), Anvan Corporation (Illinois), Anarca, Anvan Company, Anthony Antoniou, Irene Antoniou and Michael Kahles, individually and as co-partners trading as Anvan Company, shall proceed to trial on Counts II through IV of the complaint.
LOUIS C. BECHTLE, J.