was not signed in Pennsylvania and the defendant did not come to Pennsylvania in connection with the transaction in Pennsylvania and the defendant was last in Pennsylvania in 1964. All transactions concerning the note were by mail and telephone. As a result, Section 8304 does not confer jurisdiction of the defendant's person absent some "substantial connection" with Pennsylvania. See Rosen v. Solomon, 374 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
Neither does Section 8305 confer jurisdiction. That section provides that an individual "acting outside of this Commonwealth" who causes harm within the Commonwealth shall be subject to service of process and, therefore, subject to in personam jurisdiction. However, the Third Circuit has held that such language requires affirmative misconduct, not mere nonfeasance. Witt v. Scully, 539 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1976). It is alleged nonfeasance, i.e., nonpayment of a debt, by defendant that purports to bring him within the jurisdiction of this Court. Applying Witt, nonfeasance is insufficient.
Therefore, we conclude that the provisions of Pennsylvania's long arm statute do not apply and defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction will be granted.
AND NOW, this 20th day of April, 1977, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is GRANTED.
E. MAC TROUTMAN / J.
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