the severance motion were to be granted. That is, evidence of attempts to impede the FBI and Grand Jury investigations in 1976 would be admissible in support of the 1970-73 RICO and mail fraud charges. Similarly, it would be difficult indeed to try the obstruction charges without making the jury aware, at least in a general way, of the defendant's alleged connection with the matters, investigation of which was allegedly obstructed. In each of the two separate trials, the defendant would necessarily be faced with the same choice as to whether or not to testify, and if so, to what extent.
I therefore conclude that there is no merit to the motion for severance. Indeed, given the inter-relationship among all of the charges contained in this Indictment, a single trial would seem to be the only logical way to handle the matter.
F. FURTHER COMMENTS
In refusing to dismiss this Indictment, I do not disagree with the defendant's assertion that the primary thrust of the RICO statute is directed toward the protection of existing businesses engaged in interstate commerce from infiltration by elements of "organized crime," from being used as vehicles for "laundering" the proceeds of organized criminal activities, and from being perverted to methods of operation commonly associated with "organized crime." That these considerations formed the principal motive for the actions taken by Congress is apparent from the Congressional statement of purpose, as well as from the legislative history. But criminal statutes are necessarily directed at actions, not at individuals. The Congressional response was to make certain patterns of activity punishable as federal crimes, whoever may commit them. If the defendant's conduct can be shown to fall within the range of activities forbidden by the express language of the statute, it is not within the province of the Court to create an exception, merely because a strong argument can be made that the Congressional purpose might have been accomplished by a more narrowly drawn statute.
If, as the defendant argues, application of the RICO and mail fraud statutes to cases involving allegations of repeated acts of official corruption affecting interstate commerce but not involving "organized crime" in the popular sense, proves disruptive to the correct balance between federal and state law enforcement efforts, the remedy must (and no doubt will) be found in the Legislative or Executive Branches of Government, by way of amendment of the statute, or sensitive exercise of prosecutorial discretion. There can be no question about Congress' power to legislate in this field, nor as to this Court's jurisdiction.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 434 F. Supp.]
AND NOW, this 1st day of April, 1977, it is ORDERED:
1. The defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is DENIED.
2. Paragraphs 7(n) and (o) shall be deemed to have been stricken from the Indictment insofar as they relate to Counts I and II thereof, without affecting the other counts of the Indictment incorporating those paragraphs.
3. The defendant's Motion for Severance is DENIED.
JOHN P. FULLAM / J.
AND NOW, this 1st day of April, 1977, upon consideration of the defendant's Motion for Continuance and the Government's response thereto, it is ORDERED that the trial of this case shall be held commencing May 9, 1977, at 10 o'clock a.m., Courtroom 15-A, United States Courthouse, 601 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.