At this point it is sufficient simply to note that Count II pertains to the FBI's alleged "COINTELPRO" (Counterintelligence Program) operations directed against "black extremists" and/or "new left" groups and Count III involves alleged illegal interceptions of plaintiff Muhammad Kenyatta's oral and wire communications.
The present motion to dismiss Count II pertains only to the claims against certain defendants in their individual capacities. The basis for this motion is that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over these defendants.
The plaintiffs concede that all of the defendants sued individually have been or will have to be
served with process outside the territorial boundaries of this state
but claim that service nonetheless was proper either under the Pennsylvania long-arm statute or 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).
Treating plaintiffs' Section 1391(e) argument first, I join with the weight of authority in concluding that that statute does not apply where suit is brought against a federal official in his individual capacity. Relf v. Gasch, 167 U.S. App. D.C. 238, 511 F.2d 804, 807-08 nn. 15 & 18 (1975); Davis v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 369 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Colo. 1974); Paley v. Wolk, 262 F. Supp. 640, 642-43 (N.D. Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 963, 87 S. Ct. 1031, 18 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1967); see Green v. Laird, 357 F. Supp. 227, 229-30 (N.D. Ill. 1973); cf. Griffith v. Nixon, 518 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995, 96 S. Ct. 422, 46 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1975); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972); Liberation News Service v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379 (2d Cir. 1970).
Turning to the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, I note at the outset that plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving jurisdiction. See Parise v. AAA Warehouse Corp., 384 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 375 F. Supp. 318, 326 (S.D. N.Y. 1974). I find unpersuasive plaintiffs' argument that this court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over the defendants sued individually pursuant to Pennsylvania's long arm statute on the basis of their having committed tortious acts (42 Pa.C.S. § 8303), done business (42 Pa.C.S. § 8304), and caused harm (42 Pa.C.S. § 8305) in this Commonwealth. The record in this case simply fails to show that any of these defendants have had sufficient contacts with this Commonwealth to make them amenable to suit here on the cause of action alleged in Count II of the complaint.
Although Count II purports to seek redress in respect of
a Series of 'Counterintelligence Programs' intended to disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise render ineffective the political activities of American citizens or citizen organizations who have been denominated by the FBI as 'Black Extremists' or 'New Left'.
allegations of that count relate primarily to activities directed against plaintiffs Muhammad and Mary Kenyatta which took place in and around Jackson, Mississippi, during 1968 and 1969. Plaintiffs have made no showing of how these activities had any connection with or impact in Pennsylvania. The only other specific allegation is contained in paragraph 33 of the complaint, which charges that certain (unnamed) defendants mailed political leaflets to plaintiff National Association of Black Students (NABS) for the purpose of disrupting its activities. But the complaint lists the NABS as being headquartered in Washington, D.C. and, again, there is no showing of how this activity impacted upon Pennsylvania.
Finally, plaintiffs' attempt to establish each individual defendant's forum-related contacts vicariously by alleging in broad, conclusory terms that all the acts recited in the complaint, no matter by whom (whether or not a named defendant) they may have been conducted, were part of a grand overall conspiracy must also fail. Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 873 n. 14 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, supra. See also Lehigh Valley Industries, Inc. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975).
For the reasons stated above, Count II of the complaint, insofar as it seeks relief against defendants Mitchell, Sullivan, Ingram, Moore, Jamieson and Fitzpatrick individually, will be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 430 F. Supp.]
AND NOW, this 31st day of March 1977, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 25(d)(1), it is hereby ordered that the Honorable Griffin Bell, Attorney General of the United States is substituted for Edward Levi, former Attorney General of the United States, as a party to this action.
BY THE COURT:
J. William Dittes, Jr. / J.
AND NOW, this 31st day of March, 1977, for the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, it is hereby ordered that the motion to dismiss is granted as to Count II of the amended complaint insofar as that count seeks relief against defendants John N. Mitchell, William C. Sullivan, James O. Ingram, Roy K. Moore, Joe D. Jamieson, and Thomas Fitzpatrick, in their individual capacities. In all other respects the motion is denied.
BY THE COURT:
J. William Dittes, Jr. / J.