contract providing for purses of about 44%. This year, many are refusing to race for the purses of about 50% which WTA is now paying. The defendants' desire to have PHHA recognized as the bargaining agent for individuals racing at The Meadows appears to have been a strong motivation for the recent actions of the PHHA members.
The defendants argue that it is this traditional labor motivation which provides them with an exemption from the anti-trust laws. However, there has been no showing that an employer-employee relationship forms the matrix of the controversy between WTA and PHHA. Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145-147, 86 L. Ed. 750, 62 S. Ct. 520 (1942); Conley Motor Express, Inc. v. Russell, 500 F.2d 124, 126-127 (3rd Cir. 1974). On the basis of the evidence now before the court, this cannot be considered a labor dispute within the terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101. The previous contract was almost exclusively concerned with how purses were to be distributed to the owners of horses. It was not an employment contract and it did not deal with the hours, wages or working conditions of trainers, grooms or anyone else.
Indeed, while the trainers do work at The Meadows, they do not work for The Meadows. They are paid by the owners for whom they work. Likewise, the owners themselves must be considered independent businessmen rather than employees of WTA. See Taylor v. Local 7, International Union of Journeymen Horseshoers, 353 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1965). While there is nothing illegal in the desire of this "group of entrepreneurs" to have a single agent represent them, Yonkers Raceway v. Standardbred Owners Association, 153 F.2d 552, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), that desire does not exempt them from the anti-trust prohibitions against group boycotts.
Thus, while each owner, trainer and driver remains free to choose for himself whether or not he will race at The Meadows, an order will be issued enjoining the defendants from endeavoring to induce other individuals to refuse to participate in the racing events at The Meadows. The issuance of such a preliminary injunction is justified by the plaintiff's showing that: (1) there is reasonable probability that the plaintiff will succeed in proving that the defendants have acted through the PHHA to promote a group boycott at The Meadows; (2) the plaintiff has suffered and may continue to suffer injury to its business by this per se unreasonable restraint of trade, and such losses cannot be made up this season due to the limited number of racing days available under plaintiff's license from the state; (3) there is a possibility of harm to other persons and their horses involved in racing at The Meadows if an injunction is not granted; and, (4) there have been threats of physical harm and blacklisting which are contrary to the public interest. The plaintiff has satisfied the standard for preliminary injunctive relief. See Delaware River Port Authority v. Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-920 (3rd Cir. 1974).
The preliminary injunction will enjoin the defendants from threatening or harassing those owners, trainers, and drivers who do choose to race at The Meadows. The prohibition against picketing at The Meadows by the defendants for the purpose of interfering with plaintiff's business by discouraging patrons will be continued in effect pendente lite. Otto Milk Company v. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Association, 388 F.2d 789, 798-799 (3rd Cir. 1967).
Finally, in light of the general rule that a court of equity which has jurisdiction over the parties to a controversy may decide all matters in dispute and decree complete relief, Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 241-242, 80 L. Ed. 192, 56 S. Ct. 204 (1935), this court can properly decide the issue raised with respect to the allocation of stall spaces and the refusal of some individuals to remove their horses from certain stalls at The Meadows. This matter will be considered with all of the other issues at the final hearing in this action. An order will be entered at this time directing that any defendant who is requested by the WTA to move his horse to another stall or another barn at The Meadows, shall do so within 72 hours after receiving written notice from the plaintiff.
An appropriate order will be entered.