damage resulting from alleged breach of implied warranty."
The Pennsylvania courts have clearly held that contributory negligence is not a defense to an action brought under 402(a) of the Restatement of Torts. See Ferraro v. Ford Motor Company, 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966). Here the court said: "After studied consideration, it appears to us that if the buyer knows of the defect and voluntarily and unreasonably proceeds to use the product or encounter a known danger, this should preclude recovery and constitute a complete defense to the action even in cases of strict liability." The question of adequacy of warnings in such cases is for the jury. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
In view of the clear holdings of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the effect that assumption of the risk is a defense to an action under 402(a) and the ruling of the Pennsylvania court that the Uniform Commercial Code is to be construed as co-extensive with 402(a), Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Company, 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974), the court determines that in a suit brought under the Uniform Commercial Code Pennsylvania would hold that assumption of a known and unreasonable risk is a defense to an action for breach of implied warranty. It is obvious that the Pennsylvania law controls in this diversity case inasmuch as the injuries occurred in Pennsylvania and the machine was constructed and installed in Pennsylvania.
The jury had the corroborated testimony to the effect that Phillips had been warned against the use of the walker with a two pronged plug connection and further it was shown that the horses were attached to the walker by means of steel chains instead of leather halters. The steel chains would readily conduct electricity and it was testified that this was an obvious danger. Beyond that if there was an exposed wire which caused this accident it was the result of the use of the walker by the plaintiffs and the uncovering of the wire by plaintiff's horses which caused the injuries and death.
Under these circumstances, we hold that the jury was amply justified in arriving at the conclusion that no cause of action had been made out and that the plaintiffs were barred from recovery.
An appropriate order denying new trial will be entered.
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