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GEORGE TRANSP. & RIGGING CO. v. INTERNATIONAL PUBL

February 1, 1977

GEORGE TRANSPORT AND RIGGING COMPANY, INC.
v.
INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS EQUIPMENT CORPORATION and THE McCALL PRINTING COMPANY and ECONOMY PRINTING COMPANY



The opinion of the court was delivered by: BRODERICK

 BRODERICK, J.

 Plaintiff, George Transfer and Rigging Company, has brought this action against International Publications Equipment Corp ("IPEC"), *fn1" seeking to recover shipping charges in the amount of $4,072.95. *fn2" IPEC has moved pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person. For the reasons hereinafter discussed, IPEC's motion is granted.

 The facts as alleged by the plaintiff in its complaint are that plaintiff (a Maryland corporation with a place of business in Maryland) is a common carrier engaged in the business of moving goods between states, and that IPEC contracted with the plaintiff for plaintiff to transport goods through interstate commerce from the McCall Printing Company in Maryland. There were five separate shipments: two went to Indiana, two to Illinois, and one to New York. The complaint makes no reference whatsoever to Pennsylvania, nor does it make any reference to the route which the plaintiff carrier used to transport the goods to the various consignees, one in Illinois, one in Indiana, and one in New York. However, in its answer to IPEC's motion to dismiss, plaintiff attached an affidavit stating:

 
[that] part of the goods which were transported by GEORGE TRANSFER & RIGGING COMPANY, INC., at the request of INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS EQUIPMENT CORPORATION specifically those goods which traveled to Berne, Indiana . . . were transported through the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and more particularly utilized the Pennsylvania Turnpike . . .. That the goods which were transported [to New York] likewise traveled through the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

 There is no allegation that IPEC instructed plaintiff to go through Pennsylvania, nor did it designate the route plaintiff should take in delivering the goods. In fact, the above quoted affidavit indicates that the goods shipped from Maryland to Illinois did not go through Pennsylvania.

 In answering plaintiff's interrogatories for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, IPEC stated that: it had not filed a certificate to do business in Pennsylvania; it did not do business in Pennsylvania; it had not made any shipment of its products into Pennsylvania, either directly or indirectly within the last twenty years; it had never solicited any business within Pennsylvania, either by telephone or by advertisement; *fn3" it had not, within the last twenty years, entered into any contract for the sale of its goods or products within Pennsylvania, nor had it within the last twenty years owned or leased an interest in any real or personal property within Pennsylvania. Furthermore, in an affidavit attached to its motion to dismiss IPEC further stated that it "does not now and has never maintained any office within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, sales agents, distributorships, franchising arrangements, salesmen, representatives of any kind or nature whatsoever or place of business within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. . . . [but] has from time to time, as a national and international seller of equipment, had goods, wares and merchandise passed through the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for ultimate delivery to customers in other states."

 Plaintiff asserts that there is jurisdiction over IPEC in this case because the defendant has satisfied the Pennsylvania long-arm statute's requirement of doing business within the state. *fn4" 42 Pa. C.S.A. ยง 8302 (a) (1976 Supp.) provides:

 
Any foreign corporation which shall have done any business in this Commonwealth without procuring a certificate of authority to do so from the Department of State as required by statute, shall be conclusively presumed to have designated the Department of State as its true and lawful attorney authorized to accept, on its behalf, service of process in any action arising within this Commonwealth. . ..

 Section 8309(a) of the Act defines what is meant by doing business within the Commonwealth in the following language:

 
Any of the following shall constitute "doing business" for the purposes of this chapter:
 
(1) The doing by any person in this Commonwealth of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object.
 
(2) The doing of a single act in this Commonwealth for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object with the ...

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