Appeals from the Orders of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in cases of In Re: Claims of Van Buren Sharpe, Lawrence Smith, Gary L. Bicer and David Shondelmyer.
Mark B. Segal, with him Paul A. Prince, Prince & Prince, for petitioners.
Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, with him Daniel R. Schuckers, Assistant Attorney General, Sandra S. Christianson, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert P. Kane, Attorney General, for respondent.
President Judge Bowman and Judges Crumlish, Jr., Kramer, Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer, Rogers and Blatt. Opinion by President Judge Bowman.
[ 28 Pa. Commw. Page 273]
In these five consolidated appeals by claimants from adverse adjudications of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, the Board has filed motions to quash the appeals as not timely taken within thirty days of the entry of the Board's orders as mandated by Section 502, Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970 (ACJA), Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, as amended, 17 P.S. § 211.502, Pa. R.A.P. 1512(a) and Pa. R.A.P. 108, which defines date of entry.
The long quest for a uniform time in which an appeal may be taken from an administrative agency adjudication to a judicial tribunal or from one judicial tribunal to another, believed to have been achieved with a few minor exceptions through the above legislation and rules of court, has been open to question for some time as to a major class of cases, namely appeals to court from orders of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. It is the purpose of the Board in filing these motions to resolve this question.
As it is not disputed in these appeals that all of them were taken more than thirty days after the Board had entered its orders upon its dockets and mailed the same, it would appear under the above cited authority that the Board's motions are well taken. Section 502, ACJA, with one exception not here relevant, provides that appeals from any order "shall be filed within thirty days of its entry." Pa. R.A.P. 1512(a) similarly provides that a petition for review of a quasi-judicial order must be taken "within 30 days after the entry of the order." Pa. R.A.P. 108(a), applicable to appeals and petitions for review of
[ 28 Pa. Commw. Page 274]
orders and determinations of governmental units, such as the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, provides:
(a) General rule. -- Except as otherwise provided in this rule, in computing any period of time under these rules involving the date of entry of an order by a court or other government unit, the day of entry shall be the day the clerk of the court or the office of the government unit mails or delivers copies of the order to the parties, or if such delivery is not otherwise required by law, the day the clerk or office of the government unit makes such copies public. The day of entry of an order may be the day of its adoption by the court or other government unit, or any subsequent day, as required by the actual circumstances.
The comment to this rule states that its purpose is to fix a date from which the time periods as otherwise set forth in the rules shall be computed.
But these statutory provisions and rules are but the tip of the iceberg as other statutory provisions and rules of court postponing finality to orders of the Board and permitting appeals as of right from only final ...