Appeal from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in case of In Re: Claim of John B. Mayer, No. B-120910.
Harold I. Goodman, for appellant.
Daniel R. Schuckers, Assistant Attorney General, with him Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert P. Kane, Attorney General, for appellee.
President Judge Bowman and Judges Crumlish, Jr., Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer, Rogers and Blatt. Judge Kramer did not participate. Opinion by Judge Crumlish, Jr.
[ 27 Pa. Commw. Page 245]
This is an appeal by John B. Mayer (Claimant) from a denial by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) of his application for reconsideration of the Board's refusal to grant benefits.
Claimant was an employe of the George Sall Metal Company (Employer) on May 18, 1973, when the firm's maintenance and production workers (including
[ 27 Pa. Commw. Page 246]
Claimant) began a work stoppage in response to an alleged refusal by the company to bargain collectively. Claimant, with other George Sall employes, filed claims for unemployment compensation benefits at local offices of the Bureau of Employment Security (BES). BES assigned the cases to its district office in Philadelphia which ruled that the claimants were ineligible for benefits under Section 402(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Act), Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(d), on the ground that the work stoppage constituted a strike. Upon appeal, the referee affirmed BES's denial of benefits on March 6, 1974.
On April 30, 1975, in the case of Charlie Davis, a co-employe of Claimant engaged in the same work stoppage, the Board ruled that a lockout had occurred and as a result, awarded Davis benefits. On August 12, 1975, Claimant filed a petition with the Board for reconsideration. By letter dated September 23, 1975, the Board denied the petition stating it was not timely filed.
On October 22, 1975, Claimant filed an appeal with this Court. The Board responded by filing a motion to dismiss, alleging that the appeal itself was untimely. We subsequently entered an order directing merger of the Board's motion to dismiss with the merits of Claimant's appeal.
We first consider the motion to dismiss. The Board's argument is based upon its contention that Claimant is appealing from the Board's adjudication of March 6, 1974. It therefore contends that this appeal, filed on October 22, 1975, is untimely. This argument must fall.
Claimant has clearly noted throughout his brief that review has been sought of the Board's September 23, 1975 letter ...