Appeals from the Orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in cases of City of Philadelphia v. Edward Konopacki, No. 4328X July Term, 1975; and City of Philadelphia v. George Martin, No. 4331X July Term, 1975.
Kenneth E. Aaron, with him Astor & Weiss, for appellants.
Stewart M. Weintraub, Assistant City Solicitor, with him Albert J. Persichetti, Deputy City Solicitor, Stephen Arinson, Chief Deputy City Solicitor, and Sheldon L. Albert, City Solicitor, for appellee.
President Judge Bowman and Judges Crumlish, Jr. and Wilkinson, Jr., sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Wilkinson.
[ 27 Pa. Commw. Page 392]
Appellants appeal the dismissal of preliminary objections alleging that the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellee's action to enforce a tax ordinance. We affirm.
[ 27 Pa. Commw. Page 393]
Appellee has had since 1939 an ordinance which imposes a tax on all compensation earned within the city and provides penalties for violations thereof.*fn1 Appellants, non-residents of appellee, were employed between 1969 and 1973 at the United States Naval Shipyard on League Island, an area ceded to the Federal Government by the Commonwealth but within appellee's borders. Appellee brought actions against appellants in municipal court alleging violations of the tax ordinance during those years and seeking imposition of fines. Upon judgment, appellants appealed to the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas from which these appeals were taken.
Because the Commonwealth ceded the place of appellants' employment reserving only powers irrelevant here,*fn2 appellants are subject to appellee's ordinance only to the extent that the Federal Government has receded taxing powers to the Commonwealth and political subdivisions therein. Kiker v. City of Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 624, 628, 31 A.2d 289, 292, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 741 (1943). The Buck Act provides:*fn3
(a) No person shall be relieved from liability from any income tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, by reason of his residing within a Federal area or receiving income from transactions occurring or services performed in such area; and such State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect such tax in any Federal area within such State to the same extent and with the same effect as though such area was not a Federal area.
[ 27 Pa. Commw. Page 394]
Appellee unquestionably has the power to "levy and collect" taxes on income earned within its borders, even by non-residents employed in a Federal area. Non-Resident Taxpayers Association v. Municipality of Philadelphia, 341 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (D.N.J. 1971), aff'd mem., 406 U.S. 951 (1972); Kiker, supra at 633, 31 A.2d at 294. Appellants contend, however, that the power to levy and collect does not include the power to enforce such levying and collecting and, therefore, the court below lacks jurisdiction to hear an action for enforcement. We disagree. Appellee's power to enforce this very ordinance against persons identical to appellants has been affirmed repeatedly. In Philadelphia v. Cline, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 179, 184, 44 A.2d 610, 613 (1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 848 (1946), the Superior Court ruled:
[T]he power of the city to impose the penalties here in issue is apparent beyond all peradventure if League Island is 'within the limits of such city' for tax purposes. That question was squarely decided adversely to appellants' position by the Supreme Court ...