John E. Eberly, Harper, Clinger & Eberly, Warren, for appellant.
H. Robert Hampson, Hampson & Hampson, Warren, for appellees.
[ 242 Pa. Super. Page 272]
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the lower court erred in refusing appellant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.*fn1
Our scope of review in assessing a lower court's ruling on a motion for judgment n. o. v. was comprehensively summarized by Judge HOFFMAN in his opinion for the court in Eldridge v. Melcher, 226 Pa. Super. 381, 386, 313 A.2d 750, 753 (1973) (citations have been omitted):
A judgment n. o. v. is the directing of a verdict in favor of the losing party, despite a verdict to the contrary. It may only be entered in a clear case where the evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict against
[ 242 Pa. Super. Page 273]
him. Judgment n. o. v. is inappropriate if the evidence on a material point presented an issue of fact for decision by the jury. This method of attacking the verdict may never be utilized so as to invade the province of the jury, especially where that determination is based partly on questions of conflicting testimony and credibility of witnesses. Where such questions were determined by the trier of fact, and if there is reasonable support for the verdict which was rendered, a judgment n. o. v. will not be granted, as the weight of the evidence is a jury matter and may only be raised by a motion for a new trial if the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. As to whether there is reasonable support in the evidence for the verdict, it should be noted that the evidence may be found sufficient, though it be meager or uncorroborated. (Emphasis added)
Applying this standard of review of this case, we affirm.
Appellees brought this action in assumpsit to recover $643.15 under the collision coverage provisions of their insurance policy with appellant. It was the theory of appellees' case that they had made timely payment of their insurance premiums prior to the automobile accident in which appellee wife was involved on September 11, 1974, and which gave rise to appellees' claim, or, alternatively, that appellant had waived timely payment by its course of conduct with appellees during prior years.
In support of appellees' position that their premium payment was timely and their insurance coverage consequently effective on the date of the accident, appellee wife testified that she had paid the $75.00 premium by check dated September 6, 1974, and numbered as check 72, and that she had mailed the payment on the same day so that it would arrive at appellant's regional office on September 7, 1974, the payment deadline.*fn2 A beautician, she explained
[ 242 Pa. Super. Page 274]
that she and a friend wished to go to a beauty convention in Erie on September 7, and that she did not wish to make the trip from her home in ...