The opinion of the court was delivered by: LORD, III
The defendant-petitioner has moved to withdraw her plea of guilty. She was indicted on three counts of conspiracy to import narcotics, importing narcotics, and purchasing and distributing narcotics not in a package bearing tax revenue stamps. On September 15, 1970, she pleaded guilty to Count Three before the late Honorable Harold K. Wood. Judge Wood accepted the plea and on October 9, 1970 imposed a sentence of three years -- five months to be served in custody and the remainder on probation -- and a fine of $5,000.00. Petitioner has completed the sentence; she was excused from the fine on a later motion.
Petitioner argues that her guilty plea must be vacated because the colloquy at the time of her change of plea did not conform to the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The entire colloquy is reproduced in the Appendix to this opinion.
The government contends that a guilty plea cannot be withdrawn after imposition of sentence unless "manifest injustice" would result. Fed. Rule Crim. Pro. 32(d). However, it is settled that a plea may be withdrawn where the court fails "to scrupulously comply with Rule 11." United States v. Cantor, 469 F.2d 435, 437 (3d Cir. 1972). See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463-64, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 89 S. Ct. 1166 (1969).
The colloquy was deficient in two respects. First, the judge failed to ascertain whether petitioner understood the nature of the charges. In Woodward v. United States, 426 F.2d 959, 962 (3d Cir. 1970), the court noted that:
"Routine questioning or a single response by the defendant that he understands the charge is insufficient. To satisfy itself that the defendant actually does comprehend the charges, the court must explain the meaning of the charge and what basic acts must be proved to establish guilt." (Footnote omitted.)
See United States v. Cantor, supra. In Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1973), the court observed that reading the indictment to the defendant could satisfy this requirement of Rule 11, but even that was not done in this case.
In addition, the judge failed to establish that there was a factual basis for the plea as required by Rule 11. The Advisory Committee notes for Rule 11 state that:
"The court should satisfy itself, by inquiry of the defendant or the attorney for the government, or by examining the presentence report, or otherwise, that the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment."
The government argues that the judge's possession of a presentence report detailing petitioner's conduct satisfied this requirement. The Court of Appeals in Paradiso, supra, 482 F.2d at 416, specifically did not decide whether this would suffice to establish the factual basis for the plea. We hold that it does not. We agree with the Second Circuit that "any additional facts on which the court relies in determining that there is a factual basis for the plea must be put into the record at the time of the plea." Irizarry v. United States, 508 F.2d 960, 967 (2d Cir. 1974). The purpose of Rule 11 is to ensure on-the-record support for the plea. McCarthy, supra. In this case, it is clear that the judge did not even have the presentence report at the time he accepted the guilty plea. See Appendix; Gilbert v. United States, 466 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1972).
The colloquy not having complied with the requirements of Rule 11, we must permit petitioner to withdraw her plea of guilty. In light of the disposition of the motion on this basis, we find it unnecessary to reach petitioner's contention that she was entitled to be informed that her plea would lead to her deportation.