CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Burger, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE POWELL join.
This case presents the question of whether the restrictions imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 753 on the availability to an indigent prisoner of a free trial transcript to aid him in preparing a petition for collateral relief are consistent with the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in contrast to every other Court of Appeals which has ruled on the issue, held that such prisoners have an absolute right to a transcript. We reverse.
Respondent was convicted of uttering forged currency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472 after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. On June 3, 1970, he was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. He did not appeal. Nearly two years later respondent, acting pro se, filed in the District Court a paper designated "Motion for Transcript in Forma Pauperis." This was returned to respondent with the advice that he first had to file a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 before the court could act on his request for a transcript.
Respondent then filed a "complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief" in which he alleged that he "intends to move this Court for vacation of his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255." He asserted that he was unable to afford a transcript, that a transcript would show that he had not been afforded effective assistance of counsel, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict of guilty. The complaint further alleged that without a transcript respondent would be "unable to frame his arguments for fair and
effective review." The complaint did not elaborate upon respondent's two asserted grounds for relief.
The District Court treated this pleading as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, granted respondent leave to proceed in forma pauperis, appointed counsel, and held a hearing. After the hearing the court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Respondent appealed, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, 511 F.2d 1116 (1974), holding that respondent was entitled to a transcript "in order to assist him in the preparation of a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. [ § ] 2255." Id., at 1124.
Congress has expressly addressed the question of furnishing transcripts at public expense in 28 U.S.C. § 753(f), which provides in pertinent part:
"Fees for transcripts furnished in criminal proceedings to persons proceeding under the Criminal Justice Act (18 U.S.C. [ § ] 3006A), or in habeas corpus proceedings to persons allowed to sue, defend, or appeal in forma pauperis, shall be paid by the United States out of moneys appropriated for those purposes. Fees for transcripts furnished in proceedings brought under section 2255 of this title to persons permitted to sue or appeal in forma pauperis shall be paid by the United States out of money appropriated for that purpose if the trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the suit or appeal is not frivolous and that the transcript is needed to decide the issue presented by the suit or appeal...."
The statute thus provides for a free transcript for indigent prisoners asserting a claim under § 2255 if a judge certifies that the asserted claim is "not frivolous"
and that the transcript is "needed to decide the issue." The District Court, by its conclusion that respondent failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, implicity decided one of these two issues against respondent.
The Court of Appeals held that it was not necessary to declare § 753(f) unconstitutional in order to grant respondent relief. Rather, the court held that the section "does not prohibit courts from... requiring the government to supply an imprisoned indigent with a free transcript before he files a § 2255 motion. Such a court order would simply fill a constitutional deficit not addressed by the statute." (Emphasis added.) 511 F.2d, at 1119-1120.
This is a novel approach to statutory construction. The established rule is that the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that public funds may be expended unless prohibited by Congress. Reeside v. Walker, 11 How. 272, 291 (1851). This particular statute contains a limited grant of authority to the courts to authorize the expenditure of public funds for furnishing transcripts to plaintiffs in § 2255 actions. The fact that the statute does not "prohibit" the furnishing of free transcripts in other circumstances is of little significance, since most such statutes speak only in terms of granting authority for the expenditure of federal funds. Where Congress has addressed the subject as it has here, and authorized expenditures where a condition is met, the clear implication is that where the condition is not met, the expenditure is not authorized. Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929); Passenger Corp. v. Passengers Assn., 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).*fn1
It is true, as respondent observes, that the statute, as currently written, distinguishes between habeas corpus petitioners and parties proceeding under § 2255 in that only the latter must make a showing of need and nonfrivolousness in order to obtain a free transcript. Thus while it is still true that the "remedy" afforded by § 2255 is "exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus...," Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962), the right to pursue that remedy with a free transcript has now been somewhat limited by Congress.*fn2 Respondent argues that this constitutes a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in violation of Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution.
This argument presupposes, inter alia, that a right to a free transcript is a necessary concomitant of the writ which the Founders declared could not be suspended. This is obviously not the case. The writ of habeas corpus operated until 1944 with no provision for free transcripts
for indigents. See 58 Stat. 6, 28 U.S.C. § 9a (1940 ed., Supp. IV). Congress, when in that year it authorized free transcripts for the first time, could certainly have limited the authorization to non-frivolous cases where a need had been shown. If Congress could have thus limited the writ directly without "suspending" it, it follows that it may do so indirectly. The only possible objection is a Fifth Amendment due process-equal protection claim, to which we now turn.
The Court of Appeals did not technically decide this constitutional issue, since it thought it had discovered a lacuna in the statute, but its reference to a "constitutional deficit" suggests its view on this question. Respondent urges that if the statute is read as we now read it, it violates both the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and his right to "equal protection."
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not establish any right to an appeal, see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion), and certainly does not establish any right to collaterally attack a final judgment of conviction.*fn3 In this case respondent was granted a statutory right of appeal without payment of costs if he were an indigent, and had he pursued that right § 753(f) would have authorized the use of public funds to furnish him a transcript of the trial proceedings without any further showing on his part. Having forgone this right, which existed by force of statute only, he may not several ...