charge with a state or local agency does not necessarily bar a complainant's federal judicial remedy, but, as more fully discussed below, only alters the time period within which a charge with the EEOC must be filed.
The question raised in this case, therefore, is whether plaintiff, having failed to timely file a charge with the PHRC and having failed to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act, may still obtain the benefit of the extended 300-day filing period with the EEOC.
As mentioned above, the general rule is that a complaint must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. Only if the complaint has "initially instituted proceedings" with the appropriate state agency may he obtain the benefit of the extended filing period.
The purpose underlying this extended period "is to give the state agency an initial opportunity to process the claim without jeopardizing the federal right, not to extend by 120 days the time for assertion of this federal right." Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1232 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc). Where, as here, a charge is not timely filed with the appropriate state agency, the purpose for allowing the extended federal filing period is not served, since there is nothing before the state agency to process. More importantly, to allow a complainant to obtain the benefit of the extended filing period, notwithstanding the untimely filing of a state charge, would lead to the anomalous result of requiring complainants in states without unfair employment practice agencies to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act while, at the same time, allowing complainants in states with such agencies to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act, without having instituted proceedings with the state agency. Accordingly, plaintiff's failure to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of her termination from employment deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Mention should be made at this point of Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., supra, as it is the leading case concerning the issue of timely filing of employment discrimination charges. In Olson, the plaintiff filed charges of discrimination with the state agency and with the EEOC more than 180 days after, but within 300 days of, her termination from employment.
The district court held that the charge was not timely filed under § 2000e-5(e), as it was not filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the plaintiff's termination. The district court reasoned that the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of the 300-day limitation period since she did not timely file a charge with the state agency. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Unlike the district court, however, the court did not hold that a timely state filing is required to obtain the benefit of the extended federal filing period. Rather, the court held that a complainant located in a state with an unfair employment practices agency "will have at least 180 days in which to file with the state or local agency to receive the benefit of the deferral period, limited, . . . by the requirement that the charge must be filed within 30 days after the state or local agency terminates its action." 511 F.2d at 1232. In support of its holding, the court stated:
While the purpose of the extended filing provision was to ensure that the federal remedy not be lost while the states were given an opportunity to act in the employment discrimination area and not to give complainants an extra 120 days, neither do we think it was the intent of Congress to allow states to frustrate the federal remedy by imposing limitation periods shorter than the federal which a complainant must meet to receive benefit of the extended filing period. Id. at 1232.
Although some courts have adopted the Olson rule, Anderson v. Port Authority, 12 FEP Cases 1101 (W.D.Pa. Feb. 12, 1976); Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 11 FEP Cases 468 (D.Md. July 17, 1975), this Court is disinclined to do so for two reasons. First, the Olson court's reasoning, that a short state limitation period may not control the federal limitation period which a complainant must meet in order to receive the benefit of the extended filing period, is not supported by the language of § 2000e-5(e) itself. That section does not prescribe a federal period within which a complainant must file a charge with a state agency. It merely states that, if a complainant has initially instituted proceedings with a state agency, he is entitled to the benefit of the extended filing period. We are unable to discern how a complainant may be said to have "instituted" proceedings with a state agency when the state limitation period has expired.
Second, it appears that the rule in no way furthers what the Eighth Circuit deems to be the purpose underlying the extended filing period -- namely, to give the state agency an initial opportunity to process the claim without jeopardizing the federal right. If a complainant fails to file a timely charge with a state agency, there is no need to extend the period for filing with the EEOC, since there is no claim before the state to process.
Accordingly, if a complainant fails to timely file a charge of discrimination with the appropriate state or local agency, then he or she is not entitled to the benefit of the 300-day limitation period, but must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act. Since plaintiff fails to meet this requirement, the complaint must be dismissed. An appropriate Order will be entered.
AND NOW, TO WIT, this 9th day of June, 1976, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby granted.
LOUIS C. BECHTLE, J.