shoes which had previously been ordered and paid for had been returned to Melcort. (N.T. 2-45). At the time Melcort was liquidated in 1973, the address of 323 North State Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104, appeared twice on the company's records and the name Goodwyn appeared both times in connection with that address. (N.T. 2-51, 2-52).
Emma Bungard, Manager of the Loss Prevention and Check Fraud unit of the First Pennsylvania Bank, testified that Albert Goodwyn of 323 North State Street has an account with the First Pennsylvania Bank. (N.T. 2-82).
Ms. Bungard testified that on June 1, 1973, Albert Goodwyn deposited the check issued by Unity for $31.11 which was altered to $181.11 in his account and received a credit of $181.11. (N.T. 2-83).
On June 21, 1973, Albert Goodwyn deposited $370.89 in his account. Included in this deposit was the check issued by Melcort for $9.39 which was altered to $309.99, which amount was credited to the defendant's account. (N.T. 2-83).
On June 27, 1973, the bank processed a deposit for Albert Goodwyn of the check issued by Melcort for $19.98 which was altered to $319.98 and credited the defendant's account for $319.98. (N.T. 2-85).
Finally, the government and the defendant entered into a stipulation that the Unity check was received by the Franklin National Bank of Bethpage, New York from the First Pennsylvania Bank in the normal course of banking activities and that the account of Unity was charged $181.11. (N.T. 2-102). The parties also stipulated that the two Melcort Checks were received by the Worcester County National Bank in Worcester, Massachusetts from the First Pennsylvania Bank through the normal course of banking channels and that the account of Melcort was charged $319.98 and $309.99. (N.T. 2-102). The parties further stipulated that two latent fingerprints of the defendant were developed on the $9.09 Melcort check (altered to $309.09); that the endorsement "Albert Goodwyn" on the back of all three checks was in fact the signature of the defendant; and that there were some differences between the handwriting of the Susan Green who testified at the trial and the "Susan Green" endorsements on the back of the two Melcort checks. (N.T. 2-103).
The defendant, Albert Goodwyn, testified at trial in his own behalf. The defendant testified that during the early Spring of 1973 he was living and working at 323 North State Street, which address he used as an office for the Summer Camp Program for the Youth '73. (N.T. 2-114). The defendant testified that he met a Susan Green, who was not the same person as the witness who testified for the government, on the street while soliciting volunteers for his program.
According to the defendant, this Susan Green told him that she was willing to work as a volunteer and became the finance officer for the Summer Camp Program for the Youth. As finance officer, this Susan Green was in charge of purchasing supplies as well as soliciting funds. (N.T. 2-115). The defendant testified that his Susan Green worked with him for approximately four months and that she was not paid a salary, but was given an expense account. (N.T. 2-116).
The defendant testified that the Melcort check for $319.98 was given to him by his Susan Green on a Saturday in April of 1973. (N.T. 2-116, 2-117). He stated that the check was in the amount of $319.98 at the time it was given to him and that he cashed the check for her and deposited it in his checking account. (N.T. 2-117). The defendant also testified that he cashed the other Melcort check in the amount of $309.99 for his Susan Green on April 27, 1973. (N.T. 2-119). He allegedly gave her "the majority of the money [the face amount of the check] . . . for expenses and whatnot." (N.T. 2-119).
With respect to the Unity check, the defendant testified that he received it as a refund. He admitted that the Unity check was originally in the amount of $31.11 or $81.11 and that it was possible that he altered the check to $181.11 because Unity owed him that amount for a typewriter which he had ordered from them but which was out of stock. (N.T. 2-121, 2-122).
The defendant concedes that there was no error in charging the jury as to the substantive offense of unlawfully transporting an altered security in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
He further concedes that the Court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant could be found guilty of causing the altered securities to be unlawfully transported in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b). The defendant contends however that the Court erred in giving the aiding and abetting charge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). The indictment in all three counts charged the defendant with violating both 18 U.S.C. § 2314 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
18 U.S.C. § 2314 makes it a crime for one with unlawful or fraudulent intent to transport in interstate commerce an altered security, knowing the same to have been altered. 18 U.S.C. § 2 reads as follows:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.