decided: March 17, 1976.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
EDWARD CARL MOYER, APPELLANT
William H. Pugh, IV, Norristown, for appellant.
Milton O. Moss, Dist. Atty., William T. Nicholas, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Stewart J. Greenleaf, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Barry M. Miller, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Jones, C. J., and Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix and Manderino, JJ. Eagen, J., concurs in the result. Nix, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Jones, C. J., joins.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Appellant was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree for the death by stabbing of his nine year old brother. After the denial of his post-verdict motions, Moyer was committed for life to the Farview State Hospital in lieu of sentence, pursuant to section 410 of the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966.*fn1 This direct appeal followed.*fn2
The evidence at trial established that on the morning of May 15, 1973, at approximately 7:00 a. m., Moyer, then nineteen years of age and living away from home, broke into the home of his parents in Stowe, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.*fn3 Neither of his parents was home at that time; the only person in the house was Moyer's nine year old brother, Harry, who was sleeping in an upstairs bedroom. Moyer entered the kitchen of the house, removed a large butcher knife from a drawer and proceeded upstairs to his brother's bedroom. There he repeatedly stabbed his brother in the stomach and
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chest areas. A wound to the heart proved fatal. Appellant fled to his Pottstown rooming house where he was arrested a short time later. Upon questioning by the police, Moyer admitted that he had killed his brother.
At trial Moyer's defense was one of insanity. He produced psychiatric testimony to the effect that at the time of the killing, due to mental disturbance, he did not know the quality of his act or that it was wrong. This testimony thus met both parts of the M'Naghten test for insanity. Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 456 Pa. 475, 481, 321 A.2d 627, 631 (1974). In connection with his insanity defense the appellant submitted the following point for charge: "The Commonwealth has the burden of proving the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt." The trial court refused to charge as requested,*fn4 and instead instructed the jury that the defendant bore the burden of proving his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. While this was the law at that time,*fn5 it is so no longer. Commonwealth v. Williams, 463 Pa. 370, 344 A.2d 877 (1975); Commonwealth v. Cropper, 463 Pa. 529, 345 A.2d 645 (1975); Commonwealth v. Simms, 462 Pa. 26, 333 A.2d 477 (1975); Commonwealth v. Vogel, 458 Pa. 200, 321 A.2d 633 (1974); Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974); Commonwealth v. Demmitt, supra.
In Commonwealth v. Demmitt, we made it clear that where, as here, there is evidence in the case sufficient to raise the issue of insanity, the burden is then upon the Commonwealth to establish the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. This is so because, as we stated in Commonwealth v. Rose, supra, "[i]n any criminal prosecution, the Commonwealth has an unshifting
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burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crime. . . . [T]he defendant has no burden of persuasion." 457 Pa. at 389, 321 A.2d at 884. The refusal to charge as requested by appellant was thus prejudicial error and mandates the granting of a new trial.
The Commonwealth argues that our decisions in Demmitt and Rose, supra, should not be given retrospective effect because they were expressions of state evidentiary law and not founded upon constitutional principles. See Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. at 386, 321 A.2d at 883. The retroactive effect of those decisions is, however, no longer an open question in cases such as this, where the issue has been properly preserved at trial. See Commonwealth v. Williams and Commonwealth v. Simms, supra. Furthermore, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), it seems likely that our decisions in those cases were constitutionally required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Judgment of sentence reversed and a new trial ordered.*fn6
NIX, Justice (dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent.
Relying on Commonwealth v. Williams, 463 Pa. 370, 344 A.2d 877 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Simms, 462 Pa. 26, 333 A.2d 477 (1975), the majority mistakenly assumes
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that there is "no longer an open question" regarding the retroactive application of the principle announced in Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 456 Pa. 475, 321 A.2d 627 (1974), as to the appropriate burden of proof where the issue of sanity has been raised. I am unpersuaded that either Williams, supra, or Simms, supra, requires such a conclusion. While the rule announced in Commonwealth v. Demmit, supra, was applied in Williams, supra, and Simms, supra, the issue of retroactivity was not affirmatively challenged, and thus, this Court has never specifically addressed the issue of the retroactive application of the Commonwealth's burden of proof in cases where insanity is claimed.*fn1
Without resolving the question of whether or not the decision of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) constitutionally mandates the result reached in Commonwealth v. Rose, supra.*fn2 I need only point out that even the United States Supreme Court has retreated from its prior, inflexible view that full retroactivity must be given to new interpretations of the Constitution. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 93 S.Ct. 1966, 36 L.Ed.2d 736 (1973). Moreover, that Court no longer confines its inquiry to the simple distinction between direct and collateral appeal. Compare, Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966); with Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). When reviewing
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the issue of retroactivity the Supreme Court gives consideration to three criteria:
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). See, e. g., Desist v. United States, supra; Johnson v. New Jersey, supra; Linkletter v. Walker, supra. "Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved." Johnson v. New Jersey, supra at 728, 86 S.Ct. at 1778.
The fundamental reason for discarding the former rule and applying the basic standard of reasonable doubt was to prevent the possible confusion that may formerly have been engendered by the coexistence of two standards of proof. The effect of the change is not so intrinsically intertwined with the fact-finding process, that it would mandate retroactive application. United States v. Zirpolo, 450 F.2d 424, 432-3, (3rd Cir. 1971). See also Michigan v. Payne, supra; Williams v. United States, supra. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the state of our law has remained unchanged for decades, that to now insist on retroactive application would place an intolerable burden on our system.
It is clear to me that even assuming that Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra is a constitutionally mandated standard of criminal procedure, a thorough consideration of the exigencies of this ruling does not require retroactive application.