Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.


February 28, 1976

Wells H. KEDDIE, Plaintiff,

The opinion of the court was delivered by: SHERIDAN

 Plaintiff, Wells H. Keddie, filed this action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, seeking damages and declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights and for defamation and wrongful discharge arising from his tenure denial and the consequent termination of his employment as a professor at Pennsylvania State University (hereinafter Penn State). The defendants are Penn State, John W. Oswald, President of Penn State since July 1, 1970, Stanley Paulson, Dean of the College of the Liberal Arts since April 1969, and the five members of the ad hoc faculty committee that reviewed plaintiff's qualifications for tenure and unanimously recommended denial thereof -- Professors Robert K. Murray, Committee Chairman, Grant Farr, Robert Friedman, Carroll C. Arnold, and Gordon DeJong. Specifically, plaintiff, formerly a nontenured assistant professor at Penn State, alleges: (1) that the University's decision to deny him tenure and to terminate his employment was impermissibly predicated on his exercise of first amendment rights; (2) that his discharge without a pretermination hearing denied him procedural due process in violation of the fourteenth amendment; (3) that the failure of the defendants to afford him an opportunity to refute the reasons given for his dismissal, which harmed his good name, reputation, honor, and integrity, is a denial of due process; (4) that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3); and (5) that the defendants wrongfully discharged plaintiff in a defamatory manner. Plaintiff's contentions will be considered seriatim.


 On December 17, 1964, plaintiff was offered and thereafter accepted a temporary research-teaching position as Assistant Professor of Labor Studies at Penn State for the period from February 1 to June 30, 1965. On June 8, 1965, plaintiff accepted a 42-week appointment as Assistant Professor of Labor Studies, effective July 1, 1965. This was a provisional appointment with no prior academic service credit toward tenure. On April 7, 1966, plaintiff was notified that he would have earned one year of credit toward tenure as of July 1, 1966. On April 12, 1968, plaintiff was notified that he would have earned three years credit toward tenure as of July 1, 1968. On June 24, 1970, plaintiff was notified by Dean Paulson that he would have earned five years credit toward tenure as of July 1, 1970. Seven years of satisfactory probationary service is required before tenure can be awarded. As was customary with faculty members who were approaching the seven year, tenure-eligibility mark, Dean Paulson, who ultimately had the responsibility of making the final tenure decision, appointed in May 1971, five senior faculty members to an Ad Hoc Tenure Review Committee to evaluate plaintiff's performance and qualifications and make a recommendation with respect to tenure. While ordinarily the recommendation to the Dean on tenure comes from the department in which the professor teaches, plaintiff was a member of the Department of Labor Studies, a new department at the University concerned with a relatively new academic discipline. The Department of Labor Studies lacked the necessary tenured senior faculty members to provide a properly constituted tenure review committee. Thus, as was the established practice at Penn State in such cases, Dean Paulson appointed an ad hoc interdisciplinary tenure review committee, selecting its members on the basis of their academic and leadership experience and their professional backgrounds, and without regard for their political beliefs or philosophical predilections. Professor Golatz, plaintiff's department chairman, did not object to the appointment of the ad hoc committee in May 1971. Dean Paulson submitted to the ad hoc committee all the information concerning plaintiff which the University had, including all the material submitted by Professor Golatz. Professor Golatz recommended tenure for plaintiff but conceded in the recommendation that plaintiff is generally "impatient and imprudent." Professor Golatz had previously declined to recommend plaintiff for promotion from assistant to associate professor status even though 80% of the Penn State faculty members have achieved associate professor status before being awarded tenure and even though the average time for receiving the promotion to associate professor in the College of Arts and Sciences is four and one-half years. Plaintiff had been an assistant professor for approximately six years.

 The ad hoc committee reached its decision without interference by Dean Paulson, to whom its recommendation was to be made and who, as was his custom, was prepared to accept the recommendation of such a committee. At no time did Dean Paulson discuss with the ad hoc committee plaintiff's political or other extramural activities or his support of organizations or groups. Nor did Dean Paulson or any other member of the University suggest to the committee in any manner what decision they should reach. Indeed, the existence and actual membership of the committee was known only to the five committee members, who agreed the membership of the committee would be confidential, and to Dean Paulson and President Oswald. The committee was free to seek any additional information it desired.

 The ad hoc committee was an interdisciplinary group of five senior tenured professors who were chosen on the bases of their acknowledged scholarship in departments in the social sciences with which the interdisciplinary Labor Studies program is related and their experience in evaluating faculty members for tenure and academic advancement. The committee consisted of: Robert K. Murray, Professor of American History; Grant Farr, Professor of Economics; Robert Friedman, Professor of Political Science; Gordon DeJong, Professor of Sociology; and Carroll C. Arnold, Professor of Speech Communication. This committee based their evaluation of plaintiff on the usual academic criteria of teaching performance, research and publication, continuing education activities, service to the University, and scholarship and professional growth. After carefully evaluating plaintiff's performance and accomplishments in each of these categories, the committee unanimously concluded as follows: "It is therefore the committee's collective opinion, after careful examination, discussion, and deliberation, that the overall performance of Dr. Wells Keddie has been below the minimum it deems necessary for retention as a tenured staff member." While the committee's assessment of plaintiff's work in continuing education was favorable, their evaluation of teaching effectiveness was partially favorable and partially unfavorable, their evaluation of publications and research, of scholarship and professional growth were unfavorable, and service to the University was considered minimal. *fn1" In short, faculty tenure is conferred at Penn State as an award for excellence, and the ad hoc committee found that plaintiff's performance was not outstanding. A professor's work and qualifications must exceed mere competence to justify an award of tenure and hence permanent employment at Penn State.

 Plaintiff asserts that the ad hoc committee in reaching its decision impermissibly penalized him for his political and other extramural activities. Plaintiff was an active participant in political and student causes. He was a vocal critic of some policies of the United States Government, particularly its involvement in Vietnam and its social policies with respect to blacks, the poor, and other disadvantaged groups. Plaintiff believed that the Penn State administration was insensitive to the needs and demands of students and blacks, and he was a strong advocate of giving students a greater role in the governance of the University. He helped to organize and participated in protest activities directed at the University administration as well as the United States Government. He served as faculty adviser to Students for a Democratic Society and to the Ad Hoc Committee for Student Rights. He served as counsel for students charged with violating University rules before the Judiciary Board. He was an active participant in the Vietnam teach-in, Mayday anti-war rally, moratorium days, and other Vietnam protest activities. He was a member of such organizations as Coalition for Peace, Citizens Against Capital Punishment, Union for Radical Economics, Union for Radical Political Economy, and the Executive Council of the New University Conference. Plaintiff participated in the activities on the Penn State campus directed at ending the war in Southeast Asia, ending alleged racism in the United States, and in numerous campus movements directed at changing the situation of students at Penn State. He acted as counsel to students, spoke at student meetings and rallies, acted as a mediator in campus disputes, and raised bail money for students in jail. He was openly critical of the Penn State administration for many of its policies and for the failure of the University to become actively involved in social and political causes he deemed just. Plaintiff was a controversial figure on campus as a result of these activities. Plaintiff, however, has not proven that these activities affected in any manner the tenure denial decision reached by Penn State. *fn2"

 The court finds that the preponderance of the evidence clearly shows that the ad hoc committee, as well as Dean Paulson, regarded plaintiff's personal activities in the political realm and his other extramural activities *fn3" as having no effect, either favorable or unfavorable, on their tenure evaluation of him and on his academic status at the University. As stated in the ad hoc committee's final report on tenure:

"From the beginning, the committee considered Dr. Keddie's personal political beliefs as irrelevant to its examination unless such beliefs could be shown to have a detrimental effect on his academic performance. The committee did not find any demonstrable definitive connection between the two. On the other hand, the committee did not regard personal beliefs as having a positive effect on performance. That is, the committee regarded Dr. Keddie's personal activities in the political realm as having no more or less valuable or invaluable effect on his academic status as activities by other faculty members on behalf of the Republican or Democratic parties, or on behalf of church denominations, etc. . . ." See plaintiff's exhibit No. 17.

 The court finds that the committee in fact disregarded plaintiff's political and other extramural activities in the manner set forth above.

 In short, the ad hoc committee did not base its decision to recommend denial of tenure in whole or in part on plaintiff's extramural activities. The court finds that after a thorough and impartial study of plaintiff's performance and qualifications, specifically his scholarship and professional growth, service to the University, continuing education activities, research and publications, and teaching performance, the committee unanimously decided that plaintiff's academic performance had been below the minimum necessary for retention as a tenured staff member. Dean Paulson's decision to deny tenure to plaintiff was based solely upon the ad hoc committee's recommendation and the reasons the committee set forth in support of that recommendation. See plaintiff's exhibit No. 17; defendants' exhibit No. 1. Thus, the court holds that plaintiff's discharge was not predicated even in part on his exercise of first amendment rights. The evidence shows that the tenure denial has a rational basis.

 Having found that the defendants did not rely in whole or in part on constitutionally impermissible factors or criteria in reaching the tenure decision and that the decision has a rational basis, this court should not and will not undertake a de novo review of plaintiff's academic performance and qualifications. This court is powerless to substitute its judgment for that of the University as to whether plaintiff's academic credentials are such that tenure should have been awarded. The judiciary is not qualified to evaluate academic performance. The courts do not possess the expert knowledge or have the academic experience which should enlighten an academic committee's decision. The courts will not serve as a Super-Tenure Review Committee. See Chung v. Park, 3 Cir. 1975, 514 F.2d 382; Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 3 Cir. 1974, 501 F.2d 31, 40; Clark v. Holmes, 7 Cir. 1972, 474 F.2d 928; Johnson v. Branch, 4 Cir. 1966, 364 F.2d 177, 181; Simard v. Board of Education of Town of Groton, 2 Cir. 1973, 473 F.2d 988. Thus, plaintiff's contentions that the ad hoc committee did not "properly evaluate" his performance and that the committee members were not "qualified" to evaluate his academic performance simply are not cognizable in this action. The tenure decision has a rational basis and the ad hoc committee did not predicate its evaluation and decision on constitutionally impermissible factors. That is the extent of this court's power to review the substance of the tenure decision.

 In view of the court's finding that the tenure denial was not based even in part on plaintiff's political and other extramural activities and utterances, the court need not decide which of plaintiff's activities and utterances were indeed protected by the first amendment. The court notes, however, that although academic freedom is a constitutionally protected right, Healy v. James, 1972, 408 U.S. 169, 92 S. Ct. 2338, 33 L. Ed. 2d 266; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 1967, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 87 S. Ct. 675, 683, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629, 640; see generally Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 Duke Law Journal 841, academic freedom is not a license for uncontrolled expression or activity at variance with established curricular content or job-related procedures and requirements, nor does academic freedom encompass activities which are internally destructive to the proper functioning of the university or disruptive of the educational process. See Pickering v. Board of Education, 1968, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811; Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania, At Indiana, 3 Cir. 1975, 520 F.2d 1364; Clark v. Holmes, 7 Cir. 1972, 474 F.2d 928, 931. First amendment rights must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the environment in the particular case. See Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania, At Indiana, supra. As stated by the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S. Ct. at 1734, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 817:

". . . At the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."

 Thus, certain legitimate state interests may limit the right of a public employee, specifically the right of a state university professor, to say and do what he pleases: for example (1) the need to maintain discipline or harmony among co-workers; (2) the need for confidentiality; (3) the need to curtail conduct which impedes the teacher's proper and competent performance of his daily duties; (4) the need to encourage a close and personal relationship between the employee and his superiors, when that relationship calls for loyalty and confidence; (5) the need to maintain a competition of different views in the classroom and to prevent the use of the classroom by a teacher deliberately to proselytize for a personal cause or knowingly to emphasize only that selection of data best conforming to his own personal biases; (6) the need to prevent activities disruptive of the educational process and to provide for the orderly functioning of the university. See Clark v. Holmes, 7 Cir. 1972, 474 F.2d 928, 931-932; Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania, At Indiana, 3 Cir. 1975, 520 F.2d 1364; Simard v. Board of Education of Town of Groton, 2 Cir. 1973, 473 F.2d 988; Knarr v. Board of Trustees, N.D.Ind. 1970, 317 F. Supp. 832, aff'd 7 Cir. 1971, 452 F.2d 649; Robbins v. Board of Education, N.D.Ill. 1970, 313 F. Supp. 642, 645-647; Goldwasser v. Brown, 1969, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 222, 417 F.2d 1169; Hetrick v. Martin, 6 Cir. 1973, 480 F.2d 705; Johnson v. Branch, 4 Cir. 1966, 364 F.2d 177; cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 1974, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15; see generally Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 Duke Law Journal 841; Developments In The Law-Academic Freedom, 81 Harvard Law Review 1045 (1968).


 Plaintiff contends that his denial of tenure and his discharge without a pretermination hearing is a violation of procedural due process. A pretermination hearing is not a hearing held prior to any decision to terminate, but rather a hearing held prior to the termination of benefits -- in this case prior to the actual termination of employment at the end of the final academic year. Chung v. Park, 3 Cir. 1975, 514 F.2d 382, 386 & n. 7. The function of the hearing procedure is to inform the professor of the grounds for his non-retention and to allow him to challenge their sufficiency. A post-decision hearing in which the professor has the burden of proof is adequate to satisfy due process. Perry v. Sindermann, 1972, 408 U.S. 593, 603, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2700, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570, 580; Chung v. Park, 3 Cir. 1975, 514 F.2d 382, 387.

 Whether plaintiff was entitled to a pretermination hearing is dependent upon whether he had the requisite property interest in continued employment. A professor claiming a constitutionally protectable property interest in continued employment must be able to point to some objective criteria by which the university administration has indicated a willingness to limit its discretion with respect to an otherwise at-will employment relationship. The Supreme Court has held that in the case of government employment a public college professor dismissed from a tenured position, Slochower v. Board of Education, 1956, 350 U.S. 551, 76 S. Ct. 637, 100 L. Ed. 692, discharged during the term of his contract, Wieman v. Updegraff, 1952, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. Ed. 216, or terminated after receiving a clearly implied promise of continued employment, even though nontenured and without a formal contract, Connell v. Higginbotham, 1971, 403 U.S. 207, 208, 91 S. Ct. 1772, 1773, 29 L. Ed. 2d 418, 420, has an interest that is safeguarded by the due process clause. In Perry v. Sindermann, 1972, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570, the Court stated that a professor at a state college has a property interest protected by due process when he has a binding understanding fostered by the college administration -- i. e., when the state college has a de facto tenure program based on rules or established practices and that in effect the professor had de facto tenure under that program. However, in Board of Regents v. Roth, 1972, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, the Court held that a public professor who had a mere expectancy of being retained -- i. e., a unilateral expectation of it -- did not have a property interest protected by the due process clause. Property interests are not created by the Constitution, and whether a state college professor has a right to continued employment is a question of state law. Morris v. Board of Education of Laurel School District, D.Del. 1975, 401 F. Supp. 188, 208-210. As stated by the Court in Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S. Ct. at 2709, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 561:

" Certain attributes of 'property' interests protected by procedural due process emerge from these decisions. To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.
"Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law -- rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

 The relationship between a state institution and one of its teachers is essentially a matter of state concern and state law. Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 603-604, 92 S. Ct. at 2717, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 580-581 (Burger, C. J., concurring). As noted by the Court in Epperson v. Arkansas, 1968, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S. Ct. 266, 270, 21 L. Ed. 2d 228:

"Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. . . . By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values. . ." (Footnote omitted.)

 The court finds that plaintiff lacked an interest in continued employment encompassed within the fourteenth amendment's protection of property. Plaintiff had only a subjective expectancy of continued employment, not an objective expectancy based on a specific or implied contract right, a statutory entitlement, see Travis v. Teter, 1952, 370 Pa. 326, 336-337, 87 A.2d 177, or a de facto tenure system. Penn State has an established system for awarding tenure, see plaintiff's exhibits Nos. 64, 66, 67, and for the legitimate reasons set forth previously, plaintiff was denied tenure under that system. Denial of tenure to faculty members at Penn State is not unusual. During Dean Paulson's term as Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, from 1969 through 1974, tenure was granted to 104 faculty members and denied to 36. Thus, tenure was denied to approximately one-fourth of all faculty members evaluated during this period of time. Plaintiff, like all other nontenured professors at Penn State, did not have an implied promise of an award of tenure at the end of his probationary initial seven years of service. Absent contractual provisions to the contrary, in the period before tenure eligibility, which arrives after seven years of probationary employment, the professor has an at-will employment relationship with the University or a yearly contract. There is no evidence that plaintiff at any time was promised tenure by the Penn State administration. In short, the terms of plaintiff's employment secured absolutely no interest in permanent tenured status at the University, and the evidence adduced at trial supports no possible claim of entitlement to such status. See Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania, At Indiana, 3 Cir. 1975, 520 F.2d 1364, 1365.

 Since plaintiff lacked a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment, the court holds that he was not entitled to a professional tenure or pretermination hearing.

 Plaintiff also asserts that the denial of tenure, based as it was on the University's belief that his overall performance was "below the minimum it deems necessary for retention as a tenured staff member," injured his reputation and career in a manner that required Penn State to grant him a hearing in order to clear his name. The purpose of such a hearing is to provide an individual with an opportunity to be heard. Even if a person does clear his name with respect to one charge, his employer is free to deny him future employment for other reasons. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, n. 12, 92 S. Ct. at 2707, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 558. While a professor's interest in a particular teaching position does not constitute a liberty interest, a professor does have an interest in his ability to pursue his academic career and an interest in his good name which are protected by the liberty assurance of the due process clause. One acting under color of state law may not substantially impair these interests absent procedures appropriate to the various interests involved.

 The reasons given by Penn State for the tenure denial decision did not make any charges against plaintiff that could seriously damage his standing and associations in the community. It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, immorality, or illegality. See, e.g., Suarez v. Weaver, 7 Cir. 1973, 484 F.2d 678; Morris v. Board of Education of Laurel School District, D.Del. 1975, 401 F. Supp. 188, 210-211; see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 1974, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15. The University did not impose a stigma or other disability that foreclosed plaintiff's freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. Indeed, plaintiff presently is an associate professor at Livingston College, Rutgers University and was awarded tenure there on July 1, 1974, upon the recommendation of an interdisciplinary faculty committee similar in nature to the ad hoc committee at Penn State which evaluated plaintiff's performance.

 Therefore, while the liberty assurance of the due process clause requires that an individual be given notice and an opportunity to be heard in order to refute the charges where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, 92 S. Ct. at 2707, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 558; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 1971, 400 U.S. 433, 436-437, 91 S. Ct. 507, 509-510, 27 L. Ed. 2d 515, 518-519; see Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 1951, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S. Ct. 624, 95 L. Ed. 817, the reasons given to plaintiff for the tenure denial clearly do not fall within this category of reasons requiring such a hearing. *fn4" Denial of tenure because of poor or, in this case, non-excellent professional performance is not a badge of infamy. Berry v. Hamblin, M.D.Pa. 1973, 356 F. Supp. 306, 308. As previously noted, plaintiff was denied tenure not on the basis that he was incompetent, but rather on the basis that his level of performance did not meet the standard of excellence set by the University for an award of permanent employment. Mere proof that one's record of nonretention in one job makes him somewhat less attractive to other employers does not establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities or the harm to reputation amounting to the deprivation of "liberty" protected by the due process clause. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 574, n. 13, 92 S. Ct. at 2707, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 559; cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 1957, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S. Ct. 752, 1 L. Ed. 2d 796. Even a dismissal based on a finding of professional incompetence would not constitute a deprivation of "liberty" under the fourteenth amendment so as to invoke procedural due process. See Blair v. Board of Regents of State University Community College System of Tennessee, 6 Cir. 1974, 496 F.2d 322, 324. Moreover, the court finds that plaintiff's nonretention by Penn State did not have a substantial adverse effect on his academic career, as evidenced by his present tenured associate professor status at Rutgers University.

 Furthermore, between June 21, 1971, and the filing of this lawsuit, none of the defendants provided any person outside the Penn State administration with the reasons for plaintiff's tenure denial, and within the administration, the reasons were the non-derogatory ones set forth in the ad hoc tenure committee's report containing the recommendation to Dean Paulson. It was plaintiff himself who, upon receipt of notice of the tenure denial in June 1971, disclosed this information to many persons both within and without the Penn State community. Plaintiff helped to organize and participated in activities of both faculty and students to protest the tenure decision. He addressed public audiences in the fall of 1971 and in April of 1972 stating his opinion as to the reasons for tenure denial *fn5" and urging those in his audience to exert pressure on the administration to reconsider the decision. In October 1971, plaintiff personally prepared and caused to be published and widely circulated, within and without the Penn State community, a "fact sheet" disclosing the denial of tenure, his qualifications, and his criticism of the procedures used in arriving at the decision. See plaintiff's exhibit No. 6. Thus, the evidence shows that the widespread publicity concerning the tenure denial decision, along with any derogatory implications to be drawn therefrom, resulted from the actions of the plaintiff himself, not from anything the defendants did or said. In addition, the assumption that the initial "no reason" non-retention decision by the University, plaintiff not having been provided with any official statement of reasons until October 4, 1971, would have been subject to derogatory interpretations by third parties, in the absence of plaintiff's own public speculations on this matter, is not supported by any fact in the record. See Burdeau v. Trustees of California State Colleges, 9 Cir. 1974, 507 F.2d 770, 773.

 For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that defendants did not impugn the good name, reputation, honor, or integrity of plaintiff and hence did not impair his academic career. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his tenure denial ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.