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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD COMMONWEALTH PENNSYLVANIA AND MARGARET E. LENZ v. AYRES PHILADELPHIA (02/09/76)

decided: February 9, 1976.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA AND MARGARET E. LENZ, WIDOW OF RAYMOND LENZ, DECEASED
v.
AYRES PHILADELPHIA, INC. AND PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION INSURANCE COMPANY, INSURANCE CARRIER, APPELLANTS



Appeal from the Order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board in case of Margaret E. Lenz, widow of Raymond Lenz v. Ayres Philadelphia, Inc., dated June 5, 1975.

COUNSEL

John F. McElvenny, for appellants.

Frank J. Eustace, Jr., with him James N. Diefenderfer, for appellees.

Judges Crumlish, Jr., Rogers and Blatt, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Crumlish, Jr.

Author: Crumlish

[ 23 Pa. Commw. Page 250]

The issue in this workmen's compensation case is whether an acute myocardial infarction suffered by the decedent, Raymond Lenz, is a compensable injury under Section 301(c)(1) of The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation

[ 23 Pa. Commw. Page 251]

Act (Act)*fn1 in order that Margaret E. Lenz, widow of decedent (Claimant), may receive benefits.

Decedent had been employed by Ayres Philadelphia, Inc. (Appellant), as a cutter and spreader. His job required an average weekly overtime work on three days. He died on September 14, 1972, while in the course of an assignment he had performed many times before. The undisputed cause of death was a myocardial infarction, "heart attack."

Claimant timely filed a fatal claim petition seeking workmen's compensation benefits on account of decedent's death. After two hearings, the referee awarded benefits which the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirmed. Appellant now seeks review in this Court.

Section 301(c)(1) of the Act provides:

"(1) The terms 'injury' and 'personal injury,' as used in this act, shall be construed to mean an injury to an employe, regardless of his previous physical condition, arising in the course of his employment and related thereto, and such disease or infection as naturally results from the injury or is aggravated, reactivated or accelerated by the injury; and wherever death is mentioned as a cause for compensation under this act, it shall mean only death resulting from such injury and its resultant effects, and occurring within three hundred weeks after the injury. The term 'injury arising in the course of employment,' as used in this article, shall not include an injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employe because of reasons personal to him, and not directed ...


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