Appeal from order of Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, of Allegheny County, Oct. T., 1972, No. 1113, in case of Deeter-Ritchey-Sippel Associates, a corporation v. Westminster College, a corporation.
Robert W. Doty, with him Roderick G. Norris, and Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott, for appellant.
Charles M. Thorp, III, with him Clyde A. Armstrong, and Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, for appellee.
Watkins, P. J., Jacobs, Hoffman, Cercone, Price, Van der Voort, and Spaeth, JJ. Opinion by Jacobs, J. Hoffman and Spaeth, JJ., concur in the result.
[ 238 Pa. Super. Page 195]
In June of 1971, Deeter-Ritchey-Sippel Associates [hereinafter appellant], a professional corporation engaged in the practice of architecture in Allegheny County, entered into a contract with Westminster College, a non-profit corporation located in Lawrence County, for the design of a new "Science Resources Center" for the campus. After difficulties arose between the parties, the college terminated the contract in early 1972. The appellant immediately ceased working on the project and subsequently filed suit in Allegheny County to recover fees allegedly accrued at the time the relationship was severed.
[ 238 Pa. Super. Page 196]
The college filed preliminary objections challenging the venue in Allegheny County and requesting that the action be transferred to Lawrence County.*fn1 The court sustained the objections and transferred the action, and this appeal from that order followed.*fn2
The corporate venue rule, Pa.R.C.P. 2179, provides that:
"a personal action against a corporation or similar entity may be brought in and only in (1) the county where its registered office or principal place of business is located; or (2) a county where it regularly conducts business. [punctuation sic] (3) the county where the cause of action arose; or (4) a county where a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose. . . ."*fn3
These prerequisites to venue are stated in the disjunctive and acts triggering any one of the subsections are sufficient to attach venue. It is, of course, necessary to examine the factual background of the case to determine whether venue properly lies.
The appellant contends that the cause of action arose in Allegheny County, alleging that the contract was breached in Pittsburgh. The appellant contends that the contract was terminated at a meeting in Pittsburgh on January 13, 1972, when a delegation ...