entered. I turn now to a consideration of defendants' motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
2. Taxpayer Standing
The instant plaintiffs sue in two capacities: (1) as federal taxpayers; and (2) as state criminal defendants and/or "targets" of state criminal investigations. The instant defendants contend that the plaintiffs do not have standing to sue in either of those capacities. As will subsequently appear, I need not, and do not, reach the issue of plaintiffs' standing to sue insofar as they are objects of state criminal prosecutions or investigations. It is clear, however, that plaintiffs' status as federal taxpayers does not confer on them standing to bring this action.
In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968), the Supreme Court held that under certain limited circumstances a taxpayer could supply the personal stake essential to standing. Those circumstances exist when a taxpayer can show "a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated." 392 U.S. at 102, 88 S. Ct. at 1953. In Flast itself, that nexus was established by the taxpayer's challenge to an exercise of Congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. 1, § 8 on the ground that the challenged Congressional enactment exceeded a specific constitutional limitation on Congress's power to tax and spend. Id. at 102-03, 88 S. Ct. at 1954. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that taxpayer standing does not exist unless there is, as there was in Flast, a challenge to an exercise of Congress's taxing and spending power. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 94 S. Ct. 2925, 2935, 41 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S. Ct. 2940, 2945, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1974). In the instant case, where plaintiffs do not attack a Congressional enactment in their capacity as taxpayers, but rather challenge an action of the Executive Branch -- LEAA's funding of the Office of the Special Prosecutor -- they have clearly failed to satisfy the "logical nexus" test established by Flast. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, supra, at 2935; see United States v. Richardson, supra, at 2946-47. Plaintiffs therefore cannot maintain this action in their capacity as federal taxpayers.
3. Irreparable Injury
The other capacity in which plaintiffs sue is their status as state criminal defendants and/or "targets" of state criminal investigations. This status, however, does not entitle them to the only relief they seek, an injunction against further LEAA funding of the Office of the Special Prosecutor. One of the traditional prerequisites for obtaining an injunction is the threat of irreparable injury. United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U.S. 7, 95 S. Ct. 13, 15, 42 L. Ed. 2d 7 (1974) (per curiam); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502, 94 S. Ct. 669, 679, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Creamer v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 469 F.2d 1387, 1388 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972). Though the instant plaintiffs assert that they will be irreparably harmed if LEAA continues to fund the Office of the Special Prosecutor, it is clear that this assertion, which is contingent on their status as the objects of state criminal prosecutions or investigations, does not satisfy the requirement of irreparable injury. As the Supreme Court explained in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971), "Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, [can] not by themselves be considered 'irreparable' in the special legal sense of that term."
Since the instant plaintiffs allege an injury that is not "irreparable" under the applicable case law, their request for injunctive relief must be denied.
Insofar as the instant plaintiffs bring this action in their capacity as federal taxpayers, they lack standing to sue. Insofar as they sue in their capacity as state criminal defendants and/or "targets" of state grand jury investigations, they are not threatened with irreparable injury and therefore are not entitled to injunctive relief. In neither capacity have they stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, their motion for a preliminary injunction must be denied, defendants' motions to dismiss must be granted, and plaintiffs' complaint must be dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate order will be entered.
This opinion constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
DATED: January 21, 1976
BY THE COURT: A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.
AND NOW, this 21st day of January, 1976, after consideration of plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and of defendants' Motions to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED, defendants' Motions to DISMISS are GRANTED, and plaintiffs' Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
BY THE COURT: A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.