decided: January 20, 1976.
CHARLES M. ANDES
CITY OF LANCASTER AND COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA. CHARLES M. ANDES, APPELLANT
Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County in case of Charles M. Andes v. City of Lancaster and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 35 July Term, 1974.
Harry Garmon, with him George T. Brubaker, and Brubaker & Brubaker, for appellant.
Sandra S. Christianson, Assistant Attorney General, with her James N. Diefenderfer, for appellees.
Judges Kramer, Wilkinson, Jr., and Rogers, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Kramer.
[ 23 Pa. Commw. Page 57]
This is an appeal by Charles Andes from a decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County which reversed a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board granting Andes compensation pursuant to Section 108(o) of the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act.*fn1 The lower court correctly held that Andes is ineligible
[ 23 Pa. Commw. Page 58]
for compensation because of the four-year limitation set forth in Section 301(c) of the Act,*fn2 and we, therefore, affirm.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. Andes was employed as a fireman in the City of Lancaster from 1947 until 1971. For the last four years and eight months of that period, Andes worked as a dispatcher and had no exposure to the hazards of occupational disease set forth in Section 108(o) of the Act.*fn3 While at work on December 2, 1971, Andes suffered a heart attack which led to his total disability.
The term "employment in such occupation" in Section 301(c) of the Act means employment in an occupation which involves exposure to the hazard of an occupational disease.*fn4 Section 108(o) of the Act refers to "service in fire fighting" rather than "employment as a fireman." Andes was not involved in fire fighting for the last four years and eight months of his employment, and thus did
[ 23 Pa. Commw. Page 59]
not have exposure to the hazards of occupational disease as set forth in Section 108(o) during that period. The lower court correctly held that Andes does not meet the four-year limitation set forth in Section 301(c) of the Act, and that he is, therefore, ineligible for benefits.
The order of the lower court is affirmed.