after the effective date of Title VII.
Rackin v. University of Pennsylvania, supra, also involved a denial of tenure before Title VII was applicable, and continued employment after that time. Relying on Johnson, the Court allowed the plaintiff to maintain her Title VII claim. Although the Court in Rackin used some broad language implying that relief may be granted to remedy continuing effects of pre-Title VII discrimination, the plaintiff in that case apparently had alleged actual continued discrimination. For example, she claimed that she was subjected to special requirements for possible reconsideration for promotion and tenure within the English Department. 386 F. Supp. at 1006. Thus, the Court in Rackin was applying the established principle that present policies that are discriminatory because of pre-Title VII discrimination may be challenged under Title VII. Any broader interpretation of Rackin is unwarranted in light of the prior cases on which the Court relied. See 386 F. Supp. at 1006.
We have reviewed the cases cited by the plaintiffs in order to demonstrate that those cases do not support the granting of relief to remedy the effects of pre-Title VII discrimination when no continued discrimination is involved. In fact, one of the cases cited by the plaintiffs clearly refused to grant relief to men who retired before July 2, 1965 (the effective date of Title VII), even though such men continued to receive smaller pensions than similarly situated women. Rosen v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1973). The continuing effect of lower pensions seems to be exactly analogous to the types of continuing effects alleged in this case. Consequently, the refusal of the Court in Rosen to provide relief to men who retired before the effective date of Title VII is strong precedent for our decision of this case. Moreover, other courts have refused to apply the 1972 amendments retroactively to reach discriminatory practices by governmental units before March 24, 1972. See Hill-Vincent v. Richardson, 359 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Ill. 1973); O'Brien v. Shimp, 356 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
Thus, in the instant case, we can grant relief only for discriminatory practices which occurred after March 24, 1972. As to those women who were denied the use of sick days for maternity related disabilities before that date, we find no continued discrimination. Certainly many of those women did lose pay, both in money and in fringe benefits, but those losses were complete before Title VII became applicable to the defendant. The plaintiffs' allegations of lost accumulations of sick leave, vacation time, and seniority, do not indicate any discriminatory practices occurring after March 24, 1972. Unlike the defendants in the racial discrimination cases discussed previously, the defendant here has not established a seniority system or transfer policy as a thinly disguised means of continued discrimination. While the City of Philadelphia undoubtedly did discriminate before March 24, 1972, by denying sick leave to women with maternity-related disabilities, the City at that time was exempt from the provisions of Title VII. Since the effective date of the 1972 amendments, the City has not discriminated against those women. Consequently, the class of women who were denied sick leave for maternity-related disabilities prior to March 24, 1972, are not entitled to relief.
AND NOW, to wit, this 29th day of December, 1975, it is hereby Ordered that relief shall be limited to those women who were denied the use of sick leave for maternity related disabilities after March 24, 1972.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
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