. . .goes into effect, the Commission may make such order with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective.
The record evidences the fact that a full hearing was afforded the parties. In Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 216, 227-228, 71 S. Ct. 264, 95 L. Ed. 225 (1950) the Supreme Court stated that Sec. 14(1) does not require detailed findings of fact, but rather only the essential basis of the Commission's judgment. And in Kenny v. United States, 103 F.Supp. 971 (D.N.J. 1952), the court held that Sec. 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act requires:
. . that the interested parties, both the carrier and protestants, shall be afforded an adequate opportunity to be heard on the merits of the controversy; nothing more would seem to be required. Id. at 977.
There has, likewise, been no failure to afford plaintiffs due process of law in accordance with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The parties were, as the record shows, accorded a full and fair hearing and, the Commission acted speedily in issuing its December 30 order because it was apparently concerned that allowing the new rates to go into effect for any length of time would significantly disrupt the produce traffic
. Thereafter on March 14, 1975, the full opinion of the I.C.C. issued. Under 49 U.S.C. § 15(2), orders of the I.C.C. regarding rates are to take effect not less than 30 days after their issuance. Therefore, had the Commission not acted with regard for the potential disruptive effect of the new rates, and issued only its final opinion on March 14, 1975, the rates could not have been suspended until April 14, 1975, and would have been effective for three and one-half months, clearly an undesirable result.
We find the contention of plaintiffs that refunds are not appropriate in this situation to be without merit. Section 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, states:
. . . upon completion of the hearing and decision (the Commission) may by further order require the interested carrier or carriers to refund, with interest to the persons in whose behalf such amounts were paid, such portions of such increased rates or charges as by its decision shall be found not justified.
Section 15(7) further provides that the burden of proving proposed new rates to be just and reasonable is on the carrier. Therefore, it is altogether reasonable for the I.C.C., after finding that the requested rates are not just and reasonable, to order the carrier to refund any monies collected as part of the increased rates under investigation. Plaintiffs, in briefs, use the word 'reparations', which appears in Sec. 13(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, a section dealing with complaints to and investigations by the Commission of violations of law by carriers. This matter is concerned with Sec. 15 of the Act, and, more specifically, Sec. 15(7) which section deals not with rates which are in use by carriers, but rather with proposed new rates. Here, the Commission's Order which found the rates not to be just and reasonable was issued December 30, 1974, prior to the expiration of the seven-months suspension period. It is within the Commission's power to further order that any charges paid pursuant to the new rates be refunded, with interest.
For the foregoing reasons, judgment will be entered for the defendants by separate order also dismissing the Complaint and affirming the December 30, 1974, order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.