Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in case of American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, District Council 33 v. George Bucher, Leonard Ettinger, Harrison J. Trapp, Commissioners, Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, and Louis Taylor, No. 6119 September Term, 1974.
Paul L. Rucci, Assistant City Solicitor, with him Stephen Arinson, Chief Deputy City Solicitor, and Sheldon L. Albert, City Solicitor, for appellants.
Robert S. Pearlstein, with him Richard Kirschner, Miriam L. Gafni, and Markowitz & Kirschner, for appellee, AFSCME.
David H. Marion, for appellee, Trustee Ad Litem.
President Judge Bowman and Judges Crumlish, Jr., Kramer, Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer, Rogers and Blatt. Judge Mencer concurs in the result only.
[ 21 Pa. Commw. Page 603]
On December 19, 1974, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County issued an order appointing a trustee ad litem to protect the interests of certain members of the public likely to be affected by the action then pending before that court involving the Civil Service Commissioners, the Personnel Director of the City of Philadelphia (appellants) and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, District Council 33 (appellee). On January 14, 1975,
[ 21 Pa. Commw. Page 604]
appellants filed an appeal from the December 19th order with this Court. That appeal was subsequently withdrawn on February 27, 1975, and, on that same day, appellants filed a "petition for reconsideration" with the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court. Thereafter, on April 11, 1975, said petition was denied, and a second appeal was filed with this Court on April 22, 1975. Appellee responded with a motion to quash, now before us for disposition.
The order which precipitated the instant appeal was entered on December 19, 1974, but the filing of this appeal did not occur until April 22, 1975, a period well in excess of the statutorily prescribed thirty day limitation.*fn1 The question thus arises: whether the events which transpired during the period between the dates of entry of the order and of the filing of the appeal therefrom acted as a stay of the thirty day appeal period, rendering the instant appeal timely as filed?
Appellants' initial appeal to this Court was timely filed under Section 502 of the ACJA. Obviously, that action, when viewed at the date taken, would have ordinarily dispensed with the need for further consideration of Section 502. Because of two subsequent events, namely, the withdrawal of that appeal and the filing of appellants' petition for reconsideration, this is not the ordinary case. We will not pursue the novel question of whether the subsequent withdrawal of that appeal voided ab initio the January 14th filing and thereby insured the untimeliness of any later attempts by appellants to obtain review by this Court. Rather, we will assume, but only for argument's sake, that such a result would not obtain, and treat February 27, 1975, the date of said withdrawal, as the order entry date for purposes of Section 502. Therefore,
[ 21 Pa. Commw. Page 605]
unless otherwise extended by appellants' petition for reconsideration before the lower court, the thirty day appeal period of Section 502 would have expired ...