Appeal from the Order of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission in case of In Re: Application of Interstate Energy Company, a Delaware corporation, for an Order or Orders approving the construction, below grade, of its pipeline facilities to cross below the tracks of the Reading Company and others, No. A-98632.
Joseph M. O'Malley, for appellant.
Jay Rosenbush, with him Phillip R. Mann, Edward Munce, Counsel, and Peter W. Brown, Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Peter Platten, with him, of counsel, Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, for intervening appellee.
President Judge Bowman and Judges Crumlish, Jr., Kramer, Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer, Rogers and Blatt. Opinion by Judge Wilkinson.
[ 21 Pa. Commw. Page 335]
This matter is before us on a motion to quash. The issue is a narrow one and turns on whether a petition timely filed by appellant before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, entitled "Petition of . . . for Rehearing, Reargument, Modification and Rescission of the Commission's order of November 12, 1974" was in fact and law a petition for "Rehearing and Reargument, Modification and Rescission" or merely a petition for "Modification and Rescission." The point, through narrow and at first impression technical, is critical, for a petition for rehearing under Section 1006 of the Public Utility Law, Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1053, as amended, 66 P.S. § 1396, invokes the provision of Section 1101 of the Public Utility Law, 66 P.S. § 1431, extending the time for appeal to be timely filed if filed within 30 days after the entry of the order refusing the petition, referred to in the Public Utility Law as an application. On the other hand, a petition for modification and rescission is filed under the provisions of Section 1007 of the Public Utility Law, 66 P.S. § 1397, and does not extend the time for appeal.
The facts here involved, as they relate to the motion to quash and as succinctly stated in appellant Reading
[ 21 Pa. Commw. Page 336]
Company's history of the case, are that on November 12, 1974, the Public Utility Commission issued its order with an entry date of November 18, 1974, approving intervening appellee's applications. Within 15 days of the entry of this order, appellant filed the petition here in dispute. Appellee filed a motion with the Commission to quash the petition on the ground, inter alia, that it was not a proper petition for rehearing. On February 7, 1975, with the exception of minor modifications not here important, the Public Utility Commission refused the appellant's petition. On March 5, 1975, appellant filed this appeal from the Public Utility Commission's order of November 12, 1974. This appeal from the November 12, 1974 order would be timely if the petition in question were properly characterized as being one for rehearing and would be untimely filed if merely for amendment and rescission. We must hold that it is properly characterized as only a petition for amendment and rescission and, therefore, must grant the motion to quash.
Cases involving whether a petition is properly one for rehearing or merely for amendment and rescission have been before this Court when the petitioner desired it to be considered one for amendment and rescission and the respondent asserted it to be in actuality a petition for rehearing. In those cases, the petition in question has been filed more than 15 days beyond the date of the service of the order and, therefore untimely as one for rehearing. See Department of Transportation v. P.U.C., 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 554, 284 A.2d 330 (1971). Such is not the case here, for the petition was filed within the 15-day period.
The petition in question does not allege that there is new or even further cumulative evidence to present and, of course, could not allege why it was not available at the time of the hearing. A petition for rehearing ...