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July 24, 1975

JACK B. KREMENS, individually and as Hospital Director of Haverford State Hospital, et al.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: HUYETT



 Plaintiffs have filed this class action *fn1" on behalf of the named plaintiffs and all persons eighteen years of age or younger who have been, are, or may be admitted or committed to mental health facilities in Pennsylvania under the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act (Act). 50 P.S. §§ 4402 and 4403 (§§ 402 and 403). *fn2" Invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343 (3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs ask us to declare §§ 402 and 403 unconstitutional and to enjoin their enforcement. *fn3"

 Plaintiffs contend that in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, they are being denied both due process of law and equal protection of law because Pennsylvania allows plaintiffs and their class to be detained -- denied their liberty -- in mental institutions without substantial procedural safeguards including the: (1) right to notice; (2) right to a precommitment hearing; (3) right to counsel and if indigent appointment of counsel; (4) right to present evidence on their own behalf; (5) right to subpoena witnesses and documents; (6) right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against them and those who wish to admit or commit them; (7) right to be involuntarily detained only upon a decision of a judicial officer; (8) right to be involuntarily detained only upon a decision that they are in need of treatment, care, or observation. *fn4" Plaintiffs also contend that the regulations supplementing §§ 402 and 403 do not cure these sections of their constitutional infirmities because they apply only to children 13 years of age or older, require no pre-commitment hearing, and designate no time by which a post-commitment hearing must be held. *fn5" In essence, plaintiffs claim that the present procedures do not adequately assure against the mistaken commitment of children who are not mentally ill.

 In support of their claim that §§ 402 and 403 are unconstitutional, plaintiffs have submitted brief summaries of the reasons for the commitment of the named plaintiffs and other members of their class to demonstrate that many decisions to commit involve factual determinations requiring substantial procedures to guard against wrongful or erroneous commitment. We rely for our findings on the summaries contained in the final pretrial order which have been stipulated to and on defendants' exhibit numbered eight (8).

 The named plaintiffs were either admitted under § 402 or committed under § 403 to Haverford State Hospital. *fn6" Plaintiff M.W. was admitted to Haverford State Hospital under § 402 (a)(2). His mother admitted him allegedly against his wishes when he was fifteen and on December 1, 1972, he informed agents and employees of defendant of his desire to leave Haverford State Hospital. Plaintiffs K.B., S.G., L.L., and V.M. were committed to Haverford State Hospital under § 403(a)(2). Plaintiff K.B. was fifteen when his mother committed him against his wishes. He was and still is critical of some of the hospital's regulations and treatment practices. Plaintiff S.G. was seventeen when his father committed him allegedly against his wishes. Plaintiff L.L. was fifteen when her mother committed her allegedly against her wishes. Her difficulties in relating to her mother resulted in her commitment. Hospital records show that she threatened the lives of her mother and sister and that she has a personality disorder. Her parents are divorced and her father is remarried, living in Florida. At the time of her commitment and the time this action was filed, she would have preferred to have been with her father and when she is with him her behavior is excellent. Plaintiff V.M. was fourteen when her mother committed her allegedly against her wishes.

 Members of plaintiffs' class have been institutionalized for various other reasons. Patient number 13,173, a moderately retarded 13 year old child, was institutionalized in Polk State Hospital because of very sudden, explosive, rage reactions during which he attacked others and of which he has no recollection. His behavior rather than his mental retardation was the primary obstacle to his return to the community. Patient number 13,212, an educable mongoloid boy with the capacity to participate in many educable and trainable activities and who can be helped by an active special elementary program in public schools, was institutionalized in Polk State Hospital for a 1 to 2 week period so that the other members of his family could go on a family vacation. Patient number 288, a mentally retarded child, was placed in Western State Hospital because of a poor family situation. The mother of the child did not get along well with the child, and the family was afraid that she would have another nervous breakdown if the child were not placed in Western State Hospital. Patient number 281, a mentally retarded child, was placed in a state institution because she had become a management problem to both her parents and the community. Patient number 15, a mentally retarded child, was placed in Western State Hospital because the child interfered with the routine of the household and disturbed family members. The placement was based on a fear that if the child remained in his home, the mother might break down, the marriage of the child's parents might end in separation, the father's health might fail, and an adolescent daughter might be pushed into a premature marriage to escape an unhappy home. Class members have also been committed to mental hospitals for running away, robbing a gas station, stealing in general, chasing and striking a girl, arson, delinquent behavior in general, truancy, physical ailments such as colitis and weight loss, school phobia, and drug overdose.

 At the time this action was filed defendants were all Pennsylvania officials with specific duties under the Act. Defendant Jack B. Kremens as Hospital Director of Haverford State Hospital was charged under 50 P.S. §§ 4102 and 4203 with supervision and administration of Haverford State Hospital. It was to Kremens or his delegates that application for admission and commitment under §§ 402 (b) and 403 (b) of the Act had to be made. Defendant Helene Wohlegemuth as Secretary of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Secretary) had the power under 50 P.S. §§ 4201 and 4202(a) to enforce the Act, to make all regulations necessary and appropriate to the proper accomplishment of the Act, and to operate and assign functions to all state facilities. Defendant William B. Beach as the Deputy Secretary for Mental Health and Mental Retardation of the Department of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had the general authority to supervise and regulate mental health facilities in Pennsylvania.

 At the outset, defendants contend that since the purpose of the Act is to meet the child's needs through treatment and rehabilitation rather than to punish the child by incarceration for what he has done, the requirements of due process do not apply to the institutionalizing of children under §§ 402 and 403. *fn7" Defendants proceed to argue that if we determine that due process applies, we should find that in light of Pennsylvania's interest in protecting the child, preserving the family unit, maintaining the rights of parents to the custody, care, and upbringing of their children, and protecting society, the present statutes and regulations satisfy any due process requirements. Finally, defendants argue that since under §§ 402 and 403 the parents, guardians ad litem, or persons standing in loco parentis must set into motion the commitment machinery, these persons effectively waive any due process rights of plaintiffs and their class.


 Under the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process, we have developed a system whereby a person who may be subjected to a grievous loss of liberty is entitled to adequate procedural safeguards. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974). Generally, the state is required to provide substantial procedures when there is the possibility of erroneously and wrongfully depriving persons of their liberty by committing them to mental institutions. See, concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Burger in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis.), remanded, 414 U.S. 473, 94 S. Ct. 713, 38 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1974), redecided 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), remanded 421 U.S. 967, 44 L. Ed. 2d 445, 95 S. Ct. 1943, 43 U.S.L.W. 3600 (May 12, 1975); Dixon v. Attorney General Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971). These safeguards attempt to protect persons from an arbitrary or erroneous erroneous deprivation of liberty or property, whether that deprivation be imposed for benevolent or punitive reasons. They are "our best instruments for the distillation and evaluation of essential facts from the conflicting welter of data that life and our adversary methods present." They "enhance the possibility that truth will emerge from the confrontations of opposing versions and conflicting data." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1966). As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said: "The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure." Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414, 89 L. Ed. 1029, 65 S. Ct. 781 (1945) (separate opinion) cited by the majority in In re Gault, at 21. If we are to preserve our traditional liberty we must scrutinize with care any claim that it is being arbitrarily denied.

 In deciding whether the requirements of due process apply in any given case, the threshold question is whether the interest of the complaining party is within the contemplation of the liberty or property language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1971). The particular question here is whether or not a child's interest in not being institutionalized under §§ 402 and 403 is safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants would have us find that because Pennsylvania is acting as parens patriae and not as an adversary, and because the admission and commitment proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature, plaintiffs and their class may not complain of the deprivation of procedures available in criminal cases. Such a finding would ignore that the child is involuntarily removed from his home and familiar surroundings and is committed to an institution where "[he] suddenly faces the regimented routine of ward life and daily confrontation with state employees, however capable, rather than family and friends." In re Ballay, 157 U.S. App. D.C. 59, 482 F.2d 648, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1973). As the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted in Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (1968):


It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled "civil" or "criminal" or whether the subject matter be mental instability or juvenile delinquency. It is the likelihood of involuntary incarceration -- whether for punishment as an adult for a crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training as a feeble-minded or mental incompetent -- which commands observance of the constitutional safeguards of due process.

 Defendants' contention also ignores the stigma associated with civil commitment which some commentators and courts have noted may render civil commitment a more lasting abridgement of personal freedom than imprisonment for commission of a crime. *fn8" The child who faces the possibility of being physically confined for an indeterminate period with all of the ramifications of such confinement clearly has an interest within the contemplation of the liberty and property language of the Fourteenth Amendment.

 Having decided that due process applies, we are left with the questions of what process is due, Morrissey v. Brewer supra, at 481, and whether this process may effectively be waived by plaintiffs' parents, guardians ad litem, or persons standing in loco parentis. *fn9" Before discussing the process due, we shall first consider whether or not parents, guardians ad litem, or persons standing in loco parentis may effectively waive the personal rights of children, since such a finding obviates the need to decide whether the present procedure violates the constitutional right of plaintiffs to procedural due process. The question is both difficult and unique. Viewing the issue as whether or not a parent may effectively waive personal rights of a child when the child objects to the waiver creates a confrontation between a liberty interest of plaintiffs we find constitutionally protected and the consistently recognized authority of parents to direct the rearing of their children. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195, 88 S. Ct. 1274 (1968).

 We presume that in most instances parents, proceeding in utmost good faith, acting for the child, in the child's best interests, properly guide, protect, and control their children. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231, 232, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1971) the Supreme Court, stating that it was not determining the proper reconciliation of possibly competing interests of parents, children, and the state, noted that:


The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.

 Also see, Justice Stewart's concurring opinion at 237. We are not unmindful of this tradition and its importance to the structure of our society, Ginsberg at 639, and if we could find that in all instances parents act in the best interest of their children, we might also find that parents may waive constitutional rights of their children. Unfortunately, as such a graphic example as parental child abuse illustrates, *fn10" this is not the case. *fn11" In deciding to institutionalize their children, parents, as well as guardians ad litem or persons standing in loco parentis, may at times be acting against the interests of their children. With this in mind we must agree with Judge Judd in New York State Association for Retarded Children, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) that, "in the absence of evidence that the child's interests have been fully considered," parents may not effectively waive personal constitutional rights of their children. *fn12"

 Remaining is the question of what process is due. Due process is flexible in that a determination of what process is due cannot be made without an evaluation of "the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by government action." Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230, 81 S. Ct. 1743 (1961). At a minimum, it requires that "deprivation of . . . liberty . . . by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case," *fn13" but the formalities of the procedure however, "the timing and content of the notice and the nature of the hearing will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved." *fn14" Because courts cannot determine what process is due without evaluating the competing interests, the content of due process shifts as the interests shift; "the required degree of procedural safeguards varies directly with the importance of the private interest affected and the need for and usefulness of the particular safeguard in the given circumstances and inversely with the burden and any other adverse consequences of affording it." *fn15"

 As previously discussed, plaintiffs' interest in being free from the wrongful and unwarranted deprivation of their liberty is substantial and they argue that the present procedure does not adequately protect this interest. The state's interests are threefold. It has an interest in the mental health of children (parens patriae), an interest in preserving the family unit and maintaining parental authority over children, and an interest in confining, for the protection of society, those persons who pose significant danger to the community (police power). The state has decided that its interests require a relaxed, informal procedure, and it argues that a more formal procedure will substantially interfere with its interests. To strike a proper balance between the competing interests of plaintiffs and the state, we shall analyze them in the context of each procedural right of which plaintiffs claim they are being deprived. This will give us the content of the process which, at a minimum, is due before plaintiffs may be institutionalized for treatment. *fn16"


 A decision to institutionalize a child is often a difficult yet necessary decision for a child's parent to make. It is generally pursued only after all other alternatives have proven futile. The state has an interest in seeing that a procedural system will not deter parents, already faced with this difficult decision, from attempting to institutionalize children who are in need of treatment only mental institutions can provide. Further, to protect society and the individual child, the state has an interest in the immediate detention of children who may be dangerous to themselves or others. See, Lessard v. Schmidt, at 1092; Developments in the Law -- Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 1190, 1275 (1974).

 Balancing these substantial interests of the state with that of the child, we find that plaintiffs are not entitled to a pre-commitment hearing. As the Supreme Court has found with criminal cases, however, we find that, for the protection of the child, he is entitled to a hearing before an unbiased tribunal within a reasonable time to test whether there is probable cause to believe institutionalization is necessary. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-344, 87 L. Ed. 819, 63 S. Ct. 608 (1943); Morrissey v. Brewer, at 489 (1971); Lynch v. Baxley, at 388. In no event shall detention of the child in the absence of a probable cause hearing exceed seventy-two (72) hours from the date of the initial detention. See, Lynch v. Baxley, at 388; Lessard v. Schmidt, at 1091. *fn17"


 If the conclusion of the preliminary hearing is that there is probable cause for believing the child needs institutionalization, the child is entitled to a post-commitment hearing before an unbiased tribunal on the need for commitment. A delay after the probable cause hearing is permissible. This delay will allow the child to adjust to his new surroundings and will allow both the state and the child time to prepare for the post-commitment hearing to come. It will also allow the state time to examine and diagnose the child adequately. These reasons do not, however, justify a prolonged period of confinement without a final determination on the need for institutionalization and should not exceed a two-week period. A two-week period will afford all parties an opportunity to prepare adequately and properly their positions with hope of ascertaining that which is best for the child. *fn18"


 The opportunity to be heard is fundamental to due process of law. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 58 L. Ed. 1363, 34 S. Ct. 779 (1914). Without notice of that which is to transpire at a hearing "sufficiently in advance of any required hearings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded," In re Gault, at 33; Lessard v. Schmidt, at 1092; Lynch v. Baxley, at 388, the right to be heard has little significance. Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., at 314. To counterbalance this substantial interest of plaintiffs the state argues that by delaying treatment and traumatizing the child, the requirement of notice will aggravate the child's mental illness, interfere with the state's police power, and disrupt family harmony. In Gault at 21, the Supreme Court refused to accept the state's fear of trauma as a justification for limited procedures. The Court stated that the observance of due process standards will not necessarily compel the states to abandon the substantive benefits of the juvenile process. Further, as Judge Tamm noted in In re Ballay, 157 U.S. App. D.C. 59, 482 F.2d 648, 664 (D.C.Cir. 1973), the fear that added procedural requirements will produce trauma presupposes that the person who faces commitment is mentally ill. Likewise, while procedural safeguards assume that not all persons who face commitment need actually be committed, the argument that procedures will interfere with the state's police power and disrupt family harmony assumes that the child is dangerous to others and comes from a family in harmony.

 Keeping in mind that due process assures against error, we find written notice required, including the date, time, and place of the hearing, and a statement of the grounds for the proposed commitment. See, Lynch v. Baxley, at 388; Lessard v. Schmidt, at 1092. Neither the state nor plaintiffs have an interest in committing to mental institutions children not in need of institutionalization. Notice should not shield children in need of institutionalization from commitment and treatment but rather should protect children not in need of institutionalization from wrongful commitment and improper deprivation of their liberty. *fn19"


 The state fears that assistance of counsel will make institutionalization proceedings adversarial adding to the delay in treatment of the child and increasing the danger of trauma already inflicted by notice and a hearing. Yet the spectre of this particular trauma pales beside the spectre of the trauma inflicted on a child erroneously committed. *fn20" Notice and the opportunity to be heard may be of little value without the assistance of counsel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932). A child whose liberty is in question "needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it." Gault, at 36. As the right to counsel applies to criminal cases, so it must apply during all significant stages of the commitment process, and plaintiffs must be informed of both their right to counsel and if indigent their right to appointment of free counsel. See, In re Gault, at 41; Heryford v. Parker, at 397; Dixon v. Attorney General, at 966; Lessard v. Schmidt, at 1097; Lynch v. Baxley, at 389; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967); In re Barnard, 147 U.S. App. D.C. 302, 455 F.2d 1370, 1375-76 (D.C.Cir. 1971); Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076, 1083-84 (1 Cir. 1973).


 In Specht v. United States, 386 U.S. 605, 610, 18 L. Ed. 2d 326, 87 S. Ct. 1209 (1967) the Supreme Court held that commitment proceedings under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, whether denominated civil or criminal, are subject to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that due process requires that the person to be committed "be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his own. Also see, Lynch v. Baxley, at 394. In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 90 S. Ct. 1057 (1969) the Court, rejecting the argument that the right to be present is absolute, held that the right of personally confronting witnesses may be lost by consent or at times even misconduct. Expanding this holding the Lynch v. Baxley court held that the right to be present may be knowingly and intelligently waived by persons faced with involuntary commitment or by adversary counsel acting in their behalf. This procedure protects such persons' constitutional right to be present and to assist in protecting their interests, yet it recognizes that situations exist where the absence of such persons from commitment proceedings may serve their own best interests.

 We adopt the Lynch v. Baxley procedure as appropriate for plaintiffs. Accordingly, we find that a child has a constitutional right to be present at all hearings concerning his proposed commitment. See, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647, 91 S. Ct. 1976 (1971). This right may be waived by the child, however, and the unbiased tribunal may accept such a waiver upon approval by the child's counsel and upon a finding that the child understands his rights and is competent to waive them. This right may also be waived by the child's attorney, and the unbiased tribunal may accept the waiver upon a finding that the child is too ill to attend the proceedings. See, Lynch v. Baxley, at 394.


 The Supreme Court in McKiever v. Pennsylvania, supra, noting that conscientious judges are able fact finders, held that while fundamental fairness requires notice, the rights to counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination, and notice of standard of proof, it does not require jury trials. We agree.


 That the factfinder may commit error is a risk of any litigation. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1460, 78 S. Ct. 1332 (1958). The standard of proof affects this risk for it instructs the factfinder on the degree of confidence society expects him to have in the correctness of his findings. See, Mr. Justice Harlan concurring in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1969). In Winship, Justice Harlan suggests that setting the standard of proof for a particular category of adjudication reflects an assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous factual determinations. He views the decision to apply a preponderance standard to suits between private parties for money damages as a decision that an erroneous verdict is no more serious for one party than for the other. He finds the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required in the institutionalization of a child for delinquency because the social disutility of committing an innocent child -- subjecting him to a complete loss of his personal liberty -- outweighs the social disutility of committing error in his favor. *fn21"

 Following this analysis, balancing the impact of an erroneous decision to commit a person with an erroneous decision to release a person, and taking into consideration the nature of the proceedings, the Lynch v. Baxley court held:


Because the stigmatization and loss of liberty attendant upon forced confinement are of the most profound consequence to the individual affected, due process demands that he be subjected to such disabilities only if the necessity for his commitment is proved by evidence having the highest degree of certitude reasonably attainable in view of the nature of the matter at issue. In a civil commitment proceeding, the questions involved are the primarily subjective ones of the subject's mental condition and the likelihood that he will be dangerous in the future. Such subjective determinations cannot ordinarily be made with the same degree of certainty that might be achieved where purely objective facts and occurrences are at issue. Consequently, the trier of fact must be persuaded by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the subject of the hearing is in need of confinement under the minimum standards for commitment herein enumerated.

 We agree with this holding and find that the factfinder, in a hearing on commitment of a child, must apply the standard of clear and convincing proof as opposed to the standards of beyond a reasonable doubt and preponderance of the evidence. Applying a preponderance standard creates too great a risk of erroneous commitment, wrongfully depriving a child of his interest in liberty, an interest of "transcending value," *fn22" and, given the subjectivity and "relatively undeveloped state of psychiatry as a predictive science," *fn23" requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt creates too great a risk of erroneously releasing children in need of institutionalization.


 Due process requires that before a decision to commit, an adult be given the opportunity to confront and to cross-examine witnesses against him, Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. at 610; Lynch v. Baxley at 394, offer evidence in his own behalf, Specht v. Patterson at 610, and offer testimony of witnesses, Lynch v. Baxley at 394, citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 87 S. Ct. 1920 (1967). *fn24" While formalizing commitment procedures, these rights do not require the state to abandon the substantive benefits it presently hopes to achieve through treatment and rehabilitation. We commend the steps the state has taken in the interest of the mental health of children in need of institutionalization but, because of the tremendous personal as well as societal loss error might cause, we find that in addition to the rights previously discussed, the rights to confront and to cross-examine witnesses against him, to offer evidence in his own behalf and to offer testimony of witnesses are required before a decision to commit a child is made. *fn25"

 To summarize, then, we have found that before they may be institutionalized plaintiffs and others of their class are entitled to (1) a probable cause hearing within seventy-two (72) hours from the date of their initial detention; (2) a post-commitment hearing within two (2) weeks from the date of their initial detention; (3) written notice, including the date, time, and place of the hearing, and a statement of the grounds for the proposed commitment; (4) counsel at all significant stages of the commitment process and if indigent the right to appointment of free counsel; (5) be present at all hearings concerning their proposed commitment; (6) a finding by clear and convincing proof that they are in need of institutionalization; (7) the rights to confront and to cross-examine witnesses against them, to offer evidence in their own behalf, and to offer testimony of witnesses. *fn26" Accordingly, we declare the pertinent portions of Sections 402 and 403 unconstitutional on their face and as they apply to plaintiffs and others of their class, and we enjoin the enforcement of such portions. *fn27"

 The foregoing is deemed to constitute findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by F.R.Civ.P. 52(a).

 John J. Gibbons, C.J.

 Daniel H. Huyett, 3rd, D.J.

 Raymond J. Broderick, D.J.


 NOW, JULY 24, 1975, IT IS ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants. Counsel for the parties shall confer and submit an appropriate form of Order consistent with this Opinion within twenty (20) days.

 John J. Gibbons, C.J.

 Daniel H. Huyett, 3rd, D.J.

 Raymond J. Broderick, D.J.

 Re: Kevin Bartley, et al. v. Jack B. Kremens, et al., 402 F. Supp. 1039

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