-- and that such cooperation would be considered so far as both Stegmaier and Mrs. Pollack were concerned. Stegmaier, on the other hand, stated Sabinson told him that he had talked with the United States Attorney on several occasions, and that there was no problem about Mrs. Pollack, and that she would be placed on probation.
Insofar as there is a conflict between the testimony of Sabinson and Stegmaier, I accept Sabinson's version. Stegmaier argues, nonetheless, that even under Sabinson's recitation of the facts, the confession was involuntary because it was stated that Stegmaier's cooperation would be considered by the United States Attorney not only so far as Stegmaier was concerned but also with regard to Mrs. Pollack. In other words, Stegmaier contends that the agreement to consider his cooperation in Mrs. Pollack's case made his statement involuntary.
It is axiomatic that for a confession to be admissible, it must be voluntary. In resolving the issue of voluntariness, the totality of the circumstances must be considered, Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 480, 89 S. Ct. 1138, 22 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1969), including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement, Brown v. United States, 356 F.2d 230, 232 (10th Cir. 1966).
Stegmaier has had prior brushes with the law. Although I do not know the details of his criminal record, during the hearing it was said he had been a fugitive from a Bucks County burglary charge. In his statement of December 31, 1974, he made it plain that he considered himself to be an accomplished criminal. When advised to get an attorney, he rejoined that he would make his own deals. Later he escaped from prison. The reading of the Miranda rights seemed to bore him. At the hearing he said he considered himself to be reasonably intelligent and street wise. It is important to note that he was the one who initiated the conversation about probation for Mrs. Pollack on both occasions. The conclusion is inescapable that Stegmaier was mature and experienced, well able to look after his own interests during questioning. The fact that he implicated himself in an effort to secure the best possible disposition of the charges against Mrs. Pollack does not render his statement involuntary. Vogt v. United States, 156 F.2d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1946); United States v. Reese, 351 F. Supp. 719, 721 (W.D. Pa. 1972), and authorities cited therein. See also United States v. McShane, 462 F.2d 5, 7 (9th Cir. 1972).
I conclude that Stegmaier's statements to the FBI were made voluntarily, of his own free will, and not as a result of any improper inducement, threat, or promise. There is no basis for suppression.
AND NOW, this 6th day of June, 1975, after hearing and for the reasons set forth in the foregoing opinion which constitutes my findings and conclusions, the motion of Delores Pollack to suppress evidence, statements, and all evidence derived therefrom is hereby refused.
BY THE COURT:
J. W. Ditter, Jr. / J.
AND NOW, this 6th day of June, 1975, after hearing and for the reasons set forth in the foregoing opinion which constitutes my findings and conclusions, the motion of George Stegmaier to suppress evidence, statements, and all evidence derived therefrom is hereby refused.
BY THE COURT:
J. William Ditter, Jr. / J.