insure that the seller, as well as the lenders, makes the disclosures required by paragraphs (b) and (c) of 226.8 [the credit sale disclosure provision]. Since 15 U.S.C. § 1638, when read in conjunction with the definition of a creditor contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f), unequivocally requires the seller to make such disclosures when it extends or arranges for the extension of credit, this sentence would be surplusage if its purpose was merely to insure that the seller makes the credit sale disclosures. The latter of these two sentences, the one beginning "[otherwise]", delineates the disclosure responsibilities of the non-seller creditor, both in the credit sale and the consumer loan situation.
We are aware that two courts have interpreted the multiple creditor section as imposing the credit sale disclosure requirements on lenders where the seller arranges for the extension of credit. Pitts, supra; Lipscomb v. Chrysler Corporation, No. C72-792 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (unreported opinion). However, while we agree with these courts that it is the purpose of the Truth-in-Lending Act to insure maximum disclosure, we do not believe that liability for credit sale disclosures can be imposed on the lender in the face of the language of the multiple creditor section.
Plaintiff also argues that Princeton can be held liable even if we find that it had no duty to disclose information beyond that which it did disclose. Plaintiff basis this argument on an amendment to the Truth-in-Lending Act imposing liability on assignees of creditors who have not complied with the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1615, and a line of cases which has imposed liability on parties who do not themselves extend credit to the injured party. Kriger v. European Health Spa, 363 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, 361 F. Supp. 1255 (N.D. Ga. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1974); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1972). These grounds are somewhat redundant, since until the amendment dealing with assignees was passed the only way they could be held liable was if the court found their actions in bringing about the initial transactions were sufficient to make them creditors within the meaning of the Act. Plaintiff argues that this amendment demonstrates that one whom the Act does not require to make disclosures may nevertheless be liable if others fail to make the required disclosures. While we recognize that arrangements between creditors to evade the Act might be thwarted by holding all creditors to the maximum required of any creditor, we decline on this basis to impose liability for a buyer's failure to receive particular information where no express duty to disclose that information exists.
We are persuaded that our original ruling insofar as it defined the scope of plaintiff's class, granted summary judgment against defendant Springfield Dodge and in favor of defendant Princeton, dismissed without prejudice plaintiff's state law claims (except for her non-statutory reformation claim) against defendants, and granted relief in favor of plaintiff and her class, is correct. Defendant Springfield Dodge has advised us of no disputed material facts which prevent the entry of summary judgment against it. However, we shall refrain from entering summary judgment in Princeton's favor on plaintiff's reformation claim, and shall set this matter down for hearing along with plaintiff's petition for attorney's fees.
AND NOW, to wit, this 30th day of May, 1975, upon the motions of plaintiff and defendant Springfield Dodge for reconsideration of this Court's Order dated January 31, 1975, it is hereby Ordered that the motion of plaintiff for certification of a class under Federal Rule 23(b)(2) is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff is certified as the representative of all those who have been, or will be, denied their rights under 15 U.S.C. § 1638 by defendant Springfield Dodge.
Plaintiff's motion for a certification of defendants as representatives of a class of defendants is hereby DENIED.
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED as to Springfield Dodge and DENIED as to Princeton Consumer Discount Company. Defendant Princeton's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff and against Springfield Dodge in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), as well as costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. Defendant Springfield Dodge is hereby ENJOINED from arranging for the extension of credit to plaintiff or any member of the class she represents without providing the disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1638. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Princeton Consumer Discount and against plaintiff on plaintiff's claim.
A hearing shall be scheduled on the matter of plaintiff's reformation claim and plaintiff's petition for attorney's fees.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
Clarence C. Newcomer, J.