which could result to the government outweighs any inconvenience Mr. Camiel may suffer. Accordingly, we make the following Conclusions of Law and will enter the ensuing Order.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties in the instant proceedings.
2. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant proceedings, pursuant to the general supervisory power exercised by the United States District Court over proper use of process which issues from Grand Juries empaneled within the District. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jacqueline Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 1973); see 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (enforcement proceedings).
3. "Although the powers of the Grand Jury are not unlimited and are subject to the supervision of a judge, the long-standing principle that 'the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence,' except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege, United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, at 331, 94 L. Ed. 884 at 891; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438, 76 L. Ed. 375, 383, 52 S. Ct. 252 (1932); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961), is particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1972) (footnote omitted).
4. "'The personal sacrifice involved [in an appearance before the Grand Jury] is a part of the necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public.' * * * And while the duty may be 'onerous' at times, it is 'necessary to the administration of justice.'" United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10, 93 S. Ct. 764, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1973), citing Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281, 39 S. Ct. 468, 63 L. Ed. 979 (1919).
5. "The duty to testify [before a Grand Jury] may on occasion be burdensome or even embarrassing. It may cause injury to a witness' social and economic status. Yet the duty to testify has been regarded as 'so necessary to the administration of justice' that the witness' personal interest in privacy must yield to the public's overriding interest in full disclosure." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974).
6. Under the facts of the instant case, the public duty of a citizen to testify before a Grand Jury when duly subpoenaed outweighs the burden upon Mr. Camiel caused by his activity as Chairman of the Democratic City Committee, or his concern or anxiety produced by alleged harassment related to the current political campaign.
Because of the pendency of these proceedings, however, we will defer Mr. Camiel's appearance to a time to be set by the United States Attorney's office on or after May 5, 1975; this delay of five days will afford Mr. Camiel adequate opportunity to consult with his counsel in connection with his preparation for his Grand Jury appearance, particularly in light of his counsel's statement that two days preparation is all that is required. Any request for a postponement of this appearance beyond May 5, 1975, will be denied, unless the United States Attorney agrees to such postponement, or unless exigent circumstances develop, not heretofore brought to our attention, which would warrant an additional postponement of Mr. Camiel's appearance.
The following Order will be entered accordingly:
AND NOW, to wit, this 29th day of April, 1975, it is ORDERED that the appearance of Peter J. Camiel before a Grand Jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania scheduled for April 24, 1975, at 1:30 P.M. be and the same is hereby POSTPONED and STAYED until May 5, 1975, or as soon thereafter as such appearance may be scheduled by the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
With the sole exception of the postponement and stay hereinabove granted until May 5, 1975, all relief requested in the motion of Peter J. Camiel in the above captioned matter be and the same is hereby DENIED.
BY THE COURT:
HERBERT A. FOGEL J. United States District Court
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