interpretation as to the meaning of the Agreement and of the Agreement's significance in their own undertakings. In other words, there was a demonstrated attitude on the part of the Union members of non-responsibility for the terms of the Agreement and so on whim or fancy defeated any obligations entered into in the 1974 Agreement.
Such an inconsistent attitude, if manifested by all local unions of a particular branch of labor, such as the United Mine Workers of America, would create chaotic employment and harmful results to property and the public welfare. It is, therefore, incumbent upon those who are members of these unions to be cognizant of their rights and assume their responsibilities, and, further, to recognize that when and if a dispute occurs, their remedy is by the process of grievance and arbitration. Since the Agreement gives the Union and employees the right to grieve and arbitrate a dispute, that remedy must be pursued in preference to a work stoppage. Island Creek Coal Company v. United Mine Workers of America, District 2, et al., 507 F.2d 650, 652, C.A.3, 1975. The settlement of disputes provisions were bargained for and the parties have undertaken to live by them during the term of the contract. As in Island Creek Coal Company, supra, it is unquestionable that "The grievance-arbitration clause in this case is unusually broad; broad enough to permit the arbitrator to decide issues which the parties did not specifically resolve in the bargaining process." (at page 653).
The defendants also contend that unless a dispatcher is assigned to the Saturday employment for maintenance and repair workers, that they are not required to enter the mine for safety reasons. The difficulty with this contention is that it is not viewed by the defendants as a dispute and yet is a cause for work stoppage. This contention cannot support the defendants since any local trouble of any kind arising at the mine is to be read broadly even to encompass disputes over mine safety. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 94 S. Ct. 629, 38 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1974); Island Creek Coal Company, supra, 507 F.2d at page 651.
Evidence was presented by the plaintiff to the effect that the District officers and an International Board member had not earnestly endeavored to maintain the integrity of the Agreement in accordance with their undertaking. I do not consider this evidence as final to the effect that representatives of the district and international union failed to perform in accordance with their obligations under the 1974 Agreement. However, any preliminary injunction which is required as of now will be less useful against the District and the International, except insofar as they will be required to comply with the arbitration procedure set up in the Agreement, and in the meantime to see to it that the members of the Local Union maintain their work application as required by the Agreement. This is so because it has been demonstrated that loss of tonnage has accrued in the mines by reason of the refusal of the men to work on Saturdays and by reason of their potential inclination to suddenly and without notice engage in a walkout, thus providing crippling devices in the production of coal by the plaintiff.
I find that irreparable injury will result unless injunctive relief is granted to the plaintiff; and, based only upon the evidence presented before me to the date of the hearing for the preliminary injunction, I also find it likely that the plaintiff will prevail after a final hearing in the case. However, this is not certain since the parties are now encouraged to enter into immediate discovery, and as quickly as may be a final hearing will be scheduled, when the evidence may be different or provide different supports for either or both parties. As of now, I find that the plaintiff is in equity entitled to a preliminary injunction and one will be issued.
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