Appeal from the Order of the Pennsylvania Securities Commission in case of In the Matter of the Pioneer Finance Company.
Alan Z. Lefkowitz, with him Kaplan, Finkel, Lefkowitz, Roth & Astrow, for appellants.
James P. Deeley, Assistant Attorney General, with him Carl F. Safanda, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
President Judge Bowman and Judges Crumlish, Jr., Kramer, Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer, Rogers and Blatt. Opinion by Judge Rogers.
[ 17 Pa. Commw. Page 367]
The Pennsylvania Securities Commission has moved to quash appeals from its order made pursuant to the Pennsylvania Securities Act of 1972*fn1 revoking the registration exemptions of the Pioneer Finance Company and prohibiting the participation of the individual appellants in certain aspects of the securities business in this Commonwealth.
The Commission's order bears the date April 30, 1974. It was mailed to the appellants on May 2, 1974. The appeals were filed in this court on June 3, 1974.
The Commission first contends that the appeal was untimely filed.
Section 502 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970*fn2 provides that appeals shall be filed within thirty days from the date of entry of the contested order. However, the phrase "date of entry" is not defined. The Commission argues that date of entry*fn3 in this case was April 30, 1974, the date appearing on the order, and the appeal filed June 3, 1974 was untimely. However, controlling
[ 17 Pa. Commw. Page 368]
provisions of the General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure, 1 Pa. Code §§ 31.1 et seq.,*fn4 provide otherwise. Section 31.13(c) reads: "The date of issuance of an order shall be deemed to be the date of entry thereof for the purposes of computing the time for appeal under Section 502 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970 (1P.S. § 211.502) or under any other statute relating to judicial review of agency action."; and Section 31.13(a) provides in pertinent part: "In computing any period of time involving the date of the issuance of an order by an agency, the day of issuance of an order shall be the day the office of the agency mails or delivers copies of the order to the parties. . . . The day of issuance of an order may or may not be the day of its adoption by the agency. In any event, the office of the agency shall clearly indicate on each order the date of its issuance." The Commission argues that April 30, 1974, the date it placed on the order, is the date of issuance and the date of entry by reason of the final sentence of Section 31.13(a), although the order was mailed two days later. To the contrary, Section 31.13(c) clearly provides that date of issuance is the date of entry for the purpose of computing the time for appeal and Section 31.13(a) equally clearly provides that the date of issuance (and therefore date of entry) is the date of mailing. The date of the issuance and entry of the instant order is the acknowledged mailing date, May 2, 1974.
Section 31.12 of the General Rules ...