Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Roger Jay Olin, No. 643 May Term, 1973.
Edward F. Browne, Jr., for appellant.
John L. Heaton, Assistant Attorney General, with him Anthony J. Maiorana, Assistant Attorney General, Robert W. Cunliffe, Deputy Attorney General, and Israel Packel, Attorney General, for appellee.
Judges Crumlish, Jr., Mencer and Blatt, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Blatt.
[ 17 Pa. Commw. Page 177]
On September 29, 1972, Roger Jay Olin entered a guilty plea in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County to an indictment charging him with Public Indecency under Section 519 of the Penal Code, Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, as amended, 18 P.S. § 4519. Thereupon the Clerk of Courts of Lancaster County forwarded a certified record of the conviction to the Bureau of Traffic Safety (Bureau) which ordered that Olin's license be suspended for one year. The authority to do so derived from Section 618(a) of The Vehicle Code, Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, as amended, 75 P.S. § 618(a) which states:
"(a) The secretary may suspend the operating privilege of any person, with or without a hearing before the secretary or his representative, upon receiving a record of proceedings, if any, in which such person pleaded guilty, entered a plea of nolo contendere, or was found guilty by a judge or jury, or whenever the secretary finds upon sufficient evidence:
"(2) That such person has been convicted of a misdemeanor, or has forfeited bail upon such a charge, in the commission of which a motor vehicle or tractor was used."
Olin appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of York County where he resided and after a hearing, that court issued the following order:
"We believe that the issue presented in this case is whether a motor vehicle was used in some significant,
[ 17 Pa. Commw. Page 178]
as opposed to an incidental, manner in connection with the misdemeanor which admittedly occurred. We do not accept the argument of defense counsel that the motor vehicle must be used in some essential integral manner. There is no doubt from the confession that the offense occurred, and we have the date and time. We have the officer's testimony relating to the use of a motor vehicle by the Defendant immediately thereafter, at the time he was apprehended. We have the fact and circumstances that this occurred in a parking lot, some distance from town. We think the record is sufficient to support the inference which we make and the conclusion which we reach that the ...