Appeal from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in case of In Re: Claim of Reinaldo R. Mercado, No. B-73-5-F-152.
James Breslauer, with him Alan Linder and J. Richard Gray, for appellant.
Charles G. Hasson, Assistant Attorney General, with him Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, and Israel Packel, Attorney General, for appellee.
Judges Kramer, Wilkinson, Jr. and Rogers, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Wilkinson.
Claimant-appellant, a native of Puerto Rico who does not speak, read, or understand English, filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The merits of the claim are not before us, the matter having turned entirely on whether claimant-appellant had a legally sufficient excuse for filing his appeal from the determination of the Bureau late and a legally sufficient excuse for filing his appeal from the decision of the referee late.
On July 22 and 30, 1973, claimant-appellant filed claims. We will assume that an official of the Bureau advised claimant-appellant on July 30 to return to the office on August 17 "to sign up for his checks," although the evidence to support such a finding would be thin indeed. On August 2, 1973, the Bureau mailed claimant-appellant a notice, written in English, that his claim was denied. It stated specifically that he would have 10 days to appeal. He did nothing until August 17, 1973, when he returned to the office and, upon being advised that his claim was denied, stated he wished to appeal. The matter was referred to a referee to determine the narrow question of the timeliness of the appeal. On September 12, 1973, claimant-appellant was notified that the referee had dismissed his appeal as being untimely filed. To quote from claimant-appellant's attorney's letter of October 3, 1973, addressed to the Secretary of Labor and Industry:
". . . Accordingly, Mr. Mercado (claimant-appellant) was directed by a social service agency to our
office for assistance. An appeal of the Referee's Decision was not taken to the Board of Review because more than ten days had elapsed since the date of that decision.
"Accordingly, it is requested that this letter be considered a formal appeal to the Board of Review. It is our feeling that Mr. Mercado has been unfairly prejudiced by the Referee's denial of his late appeal, and that such decision should be reversed by the Board and the Department."
There is not one word in the record or in claimant-appellant's brief, other than as quoted above, to explain or justify why the October 3, 1973 letter to the Secretary should be treated as an appeal, raising the question of the timeliness of the appeal to the referee, much less one word of explanation or justification for the admitted untimeliness of the proposed appeal from the referee's decision. Since we hold that the appeal from the referee was late, we need not reach the issue of whether the appeal from the Bureau to the referee was timely. The question of claimant-appellant's lack of understanding of English is never offered as an excuse for the late appeal from the referee's decision and is, therefore, not properly before us and, consequently, we do not decide it.
The requirement of Section 502 of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 822, providing that appeals from the referee's decision must be filed within 10 days is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirement cannot be waived in the absence of fraud. This matter was recently discussed by Judge Blatt in Kitchell v. ...