and two of the additional jurisdictional statutes cited by the plaintiffs, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340 and 1346. We find the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to be inapposite. Accordingly, we turn first to the problem of ascertaining whether the jurisdictional amount is met in this case.
Notgernic will be 72 in January of 1980. He is retired and at the time of the filing of the complaint in March, 1973, he was receiving his monthly benefits. He has given no indication that he will return to work for wages in excess of $2,400 per year. Whatever the value of his benefits is between the filing of the complaint and his attaining age 72, they are not in controversy here. Ceres is over 72 years of age and his future benefits are no longer subject to the possibility of being suspended for excess earnings. He had lost a total of $4,195.50 in benefits prior to his attaining age 72 in October, 1969. The amounts of $6,145.80 and $844.80 have been withheld from Mazer and Seder, respectively, up to the date of the filing of the complaint in March of 1973. None of these amounts reach the jurisdictional level. The claim of each plaintiff is separate and distinct. They may not be aggregated to reach the requisite jurisdictional level. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 94 S. Ct. 505, 38 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S. Ct. 1053, 22 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1969); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 83 L. Ed. 1001, 59 S. Ct. 744 (1939). The claim of each plaintiff must satisfy the jurisdictional amount or his claim must be dismissed.
Mazer will attain age 72 in January of 1978, while Seder will reach that age in December of 1979. If these two individuals continue to work for wages or have earnings from self-employment, or both, annually in excess of the maximum set by the Secretary, Mazer stands to lose at least $21,113 in total benefits while Seder will have a minimum of $17,740 withheld from him. Each of these amounts are in excess of $10,000. Therefore, we have two plaintiffs over whose claims the District Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).
Under this theory of jurisdiction, the claims of Notgernic and Ceres will have to be dismissed. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., supra.
We address ourselves to the question of the jurisdiction of the District Court to entertain the claims of Mazer and Seder, as set forth in paragraph 16 of the complaint, that the suspension of payments further deprives them "of their property without due process of law by failing when benefits are so reduced or forfeited to return any part of the Social Security taxes which the employees and employers were compelled to pay in prior years." A claim for refund of taxes allegedly erroneously paid is not such a claim as could be properly presented to the Secretary under the Act. The Secretary has no authority over the collection of taxes, even though it is within his province to make a ruling that a party is in a status -- employer or employee, for example -- as would render him liable for them. Collection of FICA taxes is the responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). Claims for such refunds must be brought by a separate action, jurisdiction for which is to be found under 28 U.S.C. § 1340, regarding Internal Revenue matters, or 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a), when the United States is a defendant, to recover taxes paid. We may not treat this case as such an action, for neither the United States nor an appropriate IRS officer has been named as a party defendant. Moreover, when, as here, injunctive relief is sought, the District Court has no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a). Richardson v. Morris, 409 U.S. 464, 34 L. Ed. 2d 647, 93 S. Ct. 629 (1973).
II. MOTION TO DISMISS
One of the grounds for the motion to dismiss the complaint as not stating a claim upon which relief may be granted is similar to the one made by the Secretary regarding jurisdiction; i.e., the plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies before seeking court help. For the reasons stated in deciding the jurisdictional question, they, under the circumstances of this case, need not have exhausted those remedies before seeking relief here. The motion will be denied on this ground.
III. CLASS ACTION DETERMINATION
Of no little importance to Mazer and Seder is their motion, emphatically opposed by the Secretary, for a determination under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) whether this action may be maintained as a class action. These two plaintiffs vigorously proclaim and emphasize the superiority of the class action device as the only means by which a final, nationwide decision can be made binding on all persons concerned. They claim to represent all individuals between the ages of 65 and 72 years who are entitled to receive old-age monthly retirement benefits but whose benefits have been or are now being reduced or suspended by the Secretary because of their excess earnings.
A large segment of the estimated 2.5 million individuals entitled to retirement benefits under the Act would prefer to continue working for wages or earn income from self-employment beyond the limit set by the Act, knowing that their benefits will not be suspended or reduced if they do so. Though they are vitally interested in the outcome of a case of this kind, they, of course, are far too numerous to be joined in this action. A predominant reason why Mazer and Seder desire to maintain this action as a class action is so they may send a form of notice to each member of the proposed class. They insist that due process of law requires that some kind of notice be given and point out that subdivision (c)(2) of Rule 23 mandates that the best notice practicable under the circumstances be given to all members who can be identified through reasonable efforts in a class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3) of the rule. Mazer and Seder have submitted a proposed form of notice to be sent to each member of the suggested class. The form includes the following explanation and instructions:
"You can join in this class action by contributing the sum of $10.00 to meet the costs of the law suit. Send your check to the above address made payable to S.A.M. (Save American Manpower), a Pennsylvania foundation.