MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BECKER, District Judge.
This case is founded upon plaintiffs' claim that the imposition by the defendant title insurance companies of a so-called seller charge constituted a conspiracy to fix prices in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
On February 20, 1974, we filed a lengthy opinion, which is reported at 374 F. Supp. 564, in which we discussed the merits of the defendants' contention that the federal antitrust exemption of the business of insurance to the extent it is regulated under state law provided by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015, immunized defendants from plaintiffs' claims. We concluded that opinion, in which we elected to treat the defendants' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment under Rule 56, with the following observation:
Accordingly, while the motion for summary judgment is likely to be granted, we will defer entering an order thereon for 45 days, which will afford the parties 30 days to submit additional materials pertinent to the rule 56 motion, and 15 days thereafter to file supplemental briefs. If the plaintiffs advise the court that they have nothing additional to submit, or if their submission does not persuade us to reverse our provisional ruling, we will grant summary judgment in favor of all defendants at that time.
374 F. Supp. at 579.
We have reviewed the materials which the parties have added to the record. The supplemental materials consist in part of the matters referred to at 374 F. Supp. 570-71 nn. 6-10 upon which we were reluctant to ground our decision at that time because those matters were dehors the record and we had not previously announced to counsel our intention to judicially notice them or to treat the motion as one for summary judgment. See discussion at 374 F. Supp. 578-79. These materials bolster our earlier conclusion that the seller charge is subject to regulation. The remaining supplement to the record is in the nature of answers of the defendants to plaintiffs' interrogatories, in which the defendants have supplied revenue figures which indicate that the revenues derived from the seller charge constitute a not insubstantial portion of the defendants' total revenues during the time period the seller charge was in effect. The answers to interrogatories do not alter our earlier conclusion.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed at length in our earlier opinion, as supplemented by this Memorandum, the defendants' motion to dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment, on the ground of the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption, must be granted; hence we enter the following Order.
AND NOW, this 8th day of November 1974, IT IS ORDERED that summary judgment is granted for the defendants.
BY THE COURT: