The opinion of the court was delivered by: GREEN
In this case, defendant Woodruff, who was free on bail pending trial of this matter, did not appear for trial. The government, which intends to seek an indictment against this defendant on charges of bail jumping, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3150, has requested this Court to order the public defender who represented this defendant to respond to the questions put to him by the government relating to whether or not he advised his client as to the time and place of the trial in this matter and further as to whether or not his client responded and acknowledged that he understood the time and place of the trial.
Defense counsel agrees that the procedure by which this motion has been brought is valid and that the Court should act on the basis of the merits of the dispute so that the sole question before us is whether counsel is obligated to furnish this type of information when properly requested by the government. The essence of the question is whether the compelled disclosure which is sought will violate the attorney-client privilege. We grant the government's motion.
There is no doubt that the purpose of this rule is to promote the freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients. We set out Judge Wyzanski's statement of the privilege.
The only basis upon which the communications here may be held to be outside of the privilege is that of subject matter. The communications here were not made with the purpose of securing legal advice or assistance with respect to the legal problem of the defendant. Moreover, the nature of the communications are such that the information is not incidental to or intertwined with the legal problem of the defendant. Finally, the form of the questions and the nature of the communications together insure that privileged communications will not be drawn within their scope.
Two Circuit Courts have held that there is no breach of the attorney-client privilege in permitting a defendant's former counsel to testify that he had informed the defendant of the necessity of his appearance at a court proceeding and the time thereof. Both these cases involved prosecutions for violations of the statute under which the government intends to proceed against the present defendant. Both courts noted: that it is the duty of counsel to relay such instructions as an officer of the court; that, in this regard, defense counsel merely served as a conduit for the transmission of a message; and that, the transmission of such an instruction is not in the nature of a confidential communication. United States v. Hall, 346 F.2d 875, 882 (2d Cir., 1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 910, 86 S. Ct. 250, 15 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1965); United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69, 74 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. den., 396 U.S. 915, 24 L. Ed. 2d 192, 90 S. Ct. 235 (1969).
Wigmore has helpfully analyzed the problem presented by this motion.
"The courts have not always used consistent language in answering the question whether the privilege is limited in some way to communications necessary or material or relevant to some purpose of the consultation.
It should be clear, on the one hand, that the actual necessity of making a particular statement, or the materiality to the cause of a particular fact, cannot determine the answer, for the client cannot know what is necessary or material, and the object of the privilege is that he should be unhampered in his quest for advice. On the other hand, when he knowingly departs from that purpose and interjects other matters not relevant to it, he is in that respect not seeking legal advice, and the privilege does not design to protect him. The test is, therefore, not whether the fact or the statement is actually necessary or material or relevant to the subject of the consultation, but whether the statement is made as a part of the purpose of the client to obtain advice on that subject. Some such rule would seem to have been in the minds of all the judges in spite of the occasional apparent inconsistency of their utterances." 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2310 (McNaughton rev. 1961). (Footnotes and citations omitted)
Obviously, much depends upon the circumstances of the individual transactions." 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2296 (McNaughton rev. 1961). (footnotes omitted)
There is no doubt that one could argue that holding these communications to be within the privilege would further the purpose of the privilege in that the disclosure by counsel will inhibit the development of trust on the part of clients and, as a consequence, inhibit full communication. However, the law has always recognized competing considerations, such as the necessity of the testimony of men in the enforcement of the criminal ...