Not what you're
looking for? Try an advanced search.
Buy This Entire Record For
PHILADELPHIA YEARLY MEETING OF THE RELIGIOUS SOCY.
October 17, 1974
PHILADELPHIA YEARLY MEETING OF THE RELIGIOUS SOCIETY OF FRIENDS; F. MILES DAY; PHILADELPHIA RESISTANCE; ROBERT J. BRAND; JUDITH CHOMSKY; DONNA WOLF; ANTHONY AVIRGAN and BARBARA ROTHENBERG
JAMES H. J. TATE, Mayor, City of Philadelphia; FRED T. CORLETO, Managing Director, City of Philadelphia; FRANK L. RIZZO; GEORGE FENCL, Lieutenant, Philadelphia Police Department; and JOSEPH O'NEILL, Commissioner of Police of the City of Philadelphia
The opinion of the court was delivered by: GORBEY
This is an action seeking damages and injunctive relief as a result of the operation of the Philadelphia Police Department's surveillance and intelligence activities. On July 14, 1972, this court denied defendants' motion to dismiss. The parties then engaged in settlement negotiations extending over a year and a half. When it was finally concluded that the case could not be settled, the plaintiffs moved for designation of a class. This motion was denied by this court on March 20, 1974. Defendants have now moved for reconsideration of our denial of its motion to dismiss based on case law which has developed since the denial of the original motion. Most significantly defendants rely on the Supreme Court's reversal of the D.C. Circuit Court in the case of LAIRD v. TATUM, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 2318, 33 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1972) and DONOHOE v. DULING, 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972). It appears from a reading of the complaint that with one exception plaintiffs' allegations go no further than those contained in LAIRD v. TATUM, supra, and DONOHOE v. DULING, supra, where the Courts dismissed cases which dealt with governmental surveillance and distribution systems as not presenting a justiciable controversy. In dismissing the LAIRD case the Supreme Court stated 92 S. Ct. at 2324:
"The issue presented . . . [is] . . . whether the jurisdiction of a federal court may be invoked by a complainant who alleges that the exercise of his First Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere existence, without more, of a governmental investigative and data-gathering activity that is alleged to be broader in scope than is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a valid governmental purpose . . ."
"Allegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm; . . ."
The critical issue in this case is raised by paragraph 15 of the plaintiffs' complaint. This paragraph reads as follows:
"15. The Philadelphia Police Department has in the past improperly and unlawfully publicized its political intelligence gathering system by the unauthorized and unlawful public disclosure of information concerning named individuals and groups who are the subject of police intelligence dossiers. On June 2, 1970 in a nationwide, network television broadcast the defendants Rizzo and Fencl and their agents publicly discussed the Philadelphia Police Department dossier system and unlawfully and improperly disclosed the names of certain groups and individuals on whom such dossiers are maintained. These groups included The Friends Peace Committee, the plaintiff Philadelphia Resistance and the plaintiffs Brand, Chomsky, Wolf and Avirgan, none of whom authorized the use of their names on the aforesaid television program."
Paragraph 16 of the complaint makes a general allegation that:
"The practices described above (including those contained in paragraph 15) significantly deter the free exercise, by dissident persons, of rights of political association, assembly and speech. Persons holding political views deemed improper or unorthodox by the police are deterred from engaging in political activity in support of their views, from stating their views in public, and from joining with others in pursuance of their views."
In essence, this claim is that as a result of this one "improper and unlawful" disclosure that they are chilled in the exercise of their First Amendment rights.
In deciding whether the TATUM decision should apply to the case at bar, it is relevant to note that Justice Douglas in his dissent, at page 2332 stated:
"The intelligence reports were regularly and widely circulated and were exchanged with reports of the FBI, state and municipal ...
Buy This Entire Record For