The opinion of the court was delivered by: GORBEY
Dendants have filed two motions. The first is to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 12(b), and the second is to strike the averments of paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, R. 12(f). In response to these motions, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. As a result of this amended complaint, defendants have withdrawn their objections as to jurisdiction and service apparently conceding that jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of citizenship and that proper service has now been effected. As to the amended complaint, defendants have reasserted their motion to dismiss on the issue of statute of limitations and their motion to strike the paragraphs now numbered 6, 7, 8 and 9 in the amended complaint.
Defendants assert that plaintiff is essentially claiming that the defendants conspired to injure plaintiff in her business or profession, and that such an action would be barred by a one year statute of limitations citing AULD v. MOBAY CHEMICAL CO., 300 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
Plaintiff alleges that she began employment with Continental Can in October of 1939, and that in 1957 she was assigned to the pricing group of Continental Can. During the period between 1961 and 1973, the plaintiff alleges that she was forced, compelled and required by her supervisory personnel, which included the defendants herein, to participate in an unlawful pricing of Continental Can paper bag products in participation with Continental Can competitors. Plaintiff further alleges that in or about 1969, she attempted to formulate a special pricing list within Continental Can, which new pricing would eliminate the need for further unlawful meetings with Continental Can competitors. Despite plaintiff's request, her supervisor, defendant Harris Weaver, with the knowledge, consent, approval and participation of the defendants, Landon and Shorkey, attempted to and succeeded in undermining and displacing plaintiff in her pricing function. Plaintiff further alleges that the defendants' activity as above-mentioned resulted in her termination of employment with Continental Can; loss of promotion opportunities in the field of pricing, the humiliation; embarrassment; and loss of pension and insurance benefits.
The AULD case holds that an action for conspiracy to defame one in his business or profession is barred by the statute of limitations governing slander and libel, i.e., one year, contained in 12 P.S. § 32. Plaintiff has urged us to follow the holding in SMITH v. MORRIS, 40 Pa.D. & C. 237. This case held that an action for conspiracy to injure plaintiff in his business or occupation carries a six year statute of limitations. We agree with the defendants' position that the better rule is stated in AULD v. MOBAY CHEMICAL CO., supra, and that the applicable statute of limitations for conspiracy to injure one in his business or profession is one year. Therefore to the extent that plaintiff's complaint alleges such a cause of action, it will be barred by the one year statute of limitations.
Plaintiff argues that even if we are to apply the one year statute of limitations to any claims, that the statute begins to run from each overt act of the conspiracy for which there is injury. We agree. See AULD v. MOBAY CHEMICAL CO., supra. In the case at bar, plaintiff alleges in paragraph 17 of the complaint that the effective date of her termination from employment was July 1, 1973. Since the complaint in this case was filed in May, of 1974, that even applying the one year statute of limitations her claim would not be barred. Thus it appears from the complaint that plaintiff has alleged an injury for which she can maintain an action for conspiracy to injure one in his business or profession. Plaintiff's claim for injury for such a cause of action will be limited to one year from the filing of this action.
However, plaintiff's primary argument is that the complaint is in essence alleging interference and conspiracy to interfere with a contractual relationship. Such a tort is recognized in Pennsylvania. CASKIE v. PHILADELPHIA RAPID TRANSIT CO., 334 Pa. 33, 5 A.2d 368 (1939); KLAUDER v. CREGAR, 327 Pa. 1, 7, 192 A. 667, 670 (1937). This action is separate and distinct from that for slander or libel. See BIRL v. PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CO., 402 Pa. 297, 167 A.2d 472 (1960); See also 57 CJS Master and Servant § 631. Such an action is an action for trespass and as such, is governed by the six year statute of limitations contained in 12 P.S. § 31. See also COOPER v. FIDELITY-PHILA. TRUST CO., 201 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Thus to the extent that plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action for interference with a contractual relationship, she will not be limited to the one year statute of limitations for slander and libel. McCULLY-SMITH ASSOCIATES, INC. v. ARMOUR & CO., 358 F. Supp. 331 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
MOTION TO STRIKE PARAGRAPHS 6, 7, 8 and 9 OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AS SCANDALOUS, IMPERTINENT AND IMMATERIAL
Paragraphs 6 through 9 of the amended complaint essentially charge that between the years 1961 and 1970, plaintiff was directed by her superiors to engage in illegal price fixing activities on the part of Continental Can Company.
Defendants assert that these paragraphs are irrelevant to the issues involved in the action and thus should be stricken from the complaint. Defendants point to the fact that during the times involved in paragraphs 6 through 9, none of the named defendants occupied a supervisory position over the plaintiff, Rose Loughrey, therefore, what occurred during that period has no relevance to the cause of action asserted by plaintiff against these defendants.
"Motions to strike alleged redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter are not favored. Matter will not be stricken from a pleading unless it is clear that it can have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation. If there is any doubt as to whether under any contingency the matter may raise an issue, the motion should be denied. Even if the allegations are redundant or immaterial, they need not be stricken, if their presence in the pleading cannot prejudice the adverse party."
2A Moore's Federal Practice, § 1221(2); See also Wright & Miller Federal Practice & ...