Appeal from the Order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board in case of Florence Unverzagt v. Servomation Corporation, No. A-67511.
Joseph J. Murphy, with him Murphy, Murphy & Murphy, for appellants.
Marvin I. Block, with him James N. Diefenderfer, for appellees.
Judges Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer and Rogers, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Wilkinson.
[ 15 Pa. Commw. Page 200]
As a result of an accident on June 27, 1968, claimant-appellee has been receiving workmen's compensation for total disability under a compensation agreement. Appellants filed a petition to terminate the compensation agreement alleging that all disability resulting from this compensable accident had ceased. Appellee filed an answer denying these allegations.
After procedural steps of no moment to the issue before us, hearings were held at which claimant-appellee testified, together with her medical expert, the orthopedic surgeon who treated her. Claimant-appellee's medical expert, her treating physician, gave as his opinion that she continued to be unable to return to work at her only occupation as a waitress, and that generally there was a 50% disability of the use of the left arm. Appellants offered the testimony of a qualified
[ 15 Pa. Commw. Page 201]
orthopedic surgeon who gave as his opinion that she could return to work.
There can be no serious question, and appellants do not challenge, that the appellants had the burden of proving that the claimant-appellee's disability caused by the accident and covered by the compensation agreement had ended or that it had been reduced from total to partial disability and that work was available for which claimant-appellee was qualified and able to perform. Barrett v. Otis Elevator Company, 431 Pa. 446, 246 A.2d 688 (1968); Petrone v. Moffat Coal Co., 427 Pa. 5, 233 A.2d 891 (1967).
The referee found and the Board affirmed that appellants had not met that burden. Appellants challenge the referee and the Board on the ground that appellant's orthopedic surgeon testified that any disability appellee may have had as a result of this accident had ended. Appellants assert that the referee and the Board must have arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded this competent testimony since they did not explain why it was not considered controlling. If there had been no competent medical evidence to the contrary, appellants' position might very well be well taken. However, when there is equally competent medical testimony to the contrary, as there is here, there is no legal requirement for either the referee or the Board to justify accepting one opinion rather than the other.
The point stressed by appellants is that it should not be their duty to show that work was available. Indeed, they argue that they have met their burden of proof and the court should take judicial notice that work is available for such a partially disabled person. Clearly, such is not the law. Matrunics ...