Appeals from order of Court of Common Pleas, Trial Division, of Philadelphia, June T., 1969, Nos. 642 and 643, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. James E. Myers.
Daniel H. Greene, for appellant.
Mark Sendrow, Assistant District Attorney, with him David Richman, Assistant District Attorney, Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, and F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Jones, C. J., Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix and Manderino, JJ. Opinion by Mr. Justice Nix. Dissenting Opinion by Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Manderino.
Appellant, James E. Myers, was indicted in 1969 on charges of murder and aggravated robbery. Due to numerous delays he was never brought to trial. On August 1, 1973, appellant filed an Application to Quash Indictments on the ground that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. After a hearing on the application and an oral motion for habeas corpus on the same
ground appellant was released on bail in the amount of $20,000. However, relief on the application and oral motion was denied by Judge Levy Anderson in an Order filed October 16, 1973. Following an appeal to this Court from that Order, the Commonwealth-appellee filed a motion to quash the appeal on the ground that in its present posture the appeal to this Court is interlocutory. Having heard argument on the motion we agree with the Commonwealth and hereby remand the case for trial. In view of our finding that the appeal is interlocutory we express no view on the correctness of the ruling by the court below.
It is unquestionably the law that a defendant may appeal only from a final judgment of sentence and an appeal from any prior order will be quashed as interlocutory. A denial of a motion to quash an indictment is such an interlocutory order and an appeal therefrom will be quashed. Commonwealth v. Bunter, 445 Pa. 413, 418, 282 A.2d 705, 707 (1971), citing Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315, 108 A.2d 780 (1954). In Commonwealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 555, 227 A.2d 177 (1967) this Court, using this rationale, disallowed an appeal from a refusal to quash an indictment attacked on grounds of double jeopardy.*fn1
Although both the Bunter case and the Kilgallen case allowed the appeals despite their interlocutory character, neither case is controlling here. The Bunter Court, faced with a record devoid of any hearing by the court below on the speedy trial issue, remanded the case with the direction that such a hearing be held in order to properly preserve the issue for subsequent appellate review.
The Court in the Kilgallen case permitted the otherwise interlocutory appeal because the case involved extraordinary
circumstances dealing with criminality among public officials, particularly a City Council President and therefore, the effect on the public interest from the nature of the charges made it imperative that the validity of the indictments be decided immediately. ...