same court, in that same year, is significant. The obvious reason is that the Davis case involved different issues than the present case, and therefore could not stand as precedent for the present case. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Davis case has no effect on our decision in this case.
The distinguishing factor between the two cases is that the Davis case was concerned with HUD as an insurer of mortgages, whereas the Page decision was concerned with HUD as a seller of homes.
Accordingly, the Davis case considered whether an implied warranty arose from § 221(d) (2) of the National Housing Act; whereas the Page decision considered whether an implied warranty arose from the contract of sale.
The Government states that the decision in the instant action was based upon the theory that the duty imposed upon HUD under Section 221(d) (2) creates a warranty that mortgages insured under these sections complies with local housing code standards, and, that said warranty was breached because the dwelling did not comply with the Philadelphia Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention Ordinance. The Government, however, did not realize that this theory, which constituted only one paragraph of a fifteen page decision, was one of the many surrounding circumstances tending to show that an implied warranty arose from the contract of sale; or at most, this theory was only an alternative theory of relief.
The prime thrust of the case at bar is based upon HUD as a seller of properties and not as an insurer of mortgages.
This Court held in its September 7th decision that HUD as the seller of properties, breached an implied warranty of habitability by selling a house that contained dangerous amounts of lead paint. The doctrine that an implied warranty of habitability arises from the sale of a home has recently been restated in the case of Rattigen et ux. v. Cooke Jr. et al., 21 Chester 224 (1973).
This holding was based entirely on contract law and was not concerned with Section 221(d) (2) of the National Housing Act. Section 221(d) (2) only applies to HUD's role as an insurer of mortgages and not as a seller of properties.
For these reasons, the Appellate decision in the Davis case provides no basis for vacating this Court's Order of September 7, 1973.
Parenthetically, we note that in the present motion, as in the previous motion by the Government to Extend the time to answer, move or otherwise plead (See Order of September 25, 1973), the Government has failed to comply with Local Rule 36, which requires five (5) days notice to opposing counsel prior to the filing of a Motion.