given to him by Mr. Franklin a short distance from the corner. Chief Palumbo stopped his car and got out. One of the men looked at Chief Palumbo and immediately ran around a corner, up another street, and out of sight. Chief Palumbo went up to the remaining man, the defendant in this case, grabbed him by the arm and said, "I want to talk to you". The Chief then put the defendant in the back seat of the cruiser so he would not run away. There were no door handles on the inside of the back seat of the cruiser. The Chief got back into the driver's seat intending to pursue the man who had fled. As the cruiser began to move down the alley, Chief Palumbo observed the defendant in the rear-view mirror unzipping his jacket as if to get something out from under it. Chief Palumbo immediately stopped the cruiser, removed the defendant from the back seat, searched him, and discovered a sawed-off shotgun concealed under his jacket.
We believe that the limited detention and search of the defendant, based upon the facts developed at the evidentiary hearing which were known to Chief Palumbo, was wholly reasonable under the circumstances. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
The deliberately furtive actions of the defendant and his companion as related to Chief Palumbo by the bank's manager, combined with the flight of the defendant's companion at the approach of a police officer, were factors which justified the Chief in stopping the defendant to establish his identity and question him as to his conduct. Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968). Clearly, under the circumstances for the Chief to have ignored the defendant without so much as attempting to question him and further investigate his conduct, would have been unreasonable.
That the Chief grabbed the defendant by the arm, stated "I want to talk to you", and placed him in the police car, all apparently without protest, was, we believe, reasonable police conduct under the circumstances and reasonably calculated to maintain the status quo between the Chief and the suspects pending further developments and investigation. Obviously, the Chief had a duty to attempt to apprehend and question the defendant's companion, who had fled at his approach, without letting the defendant, who was also acting suspiciously, remain at large. The Chief was alone and confronted by two individuals whose conduct gave rise to a well-founded suspicion that they were contemplating a daylight robbery of either the bank itself or a courier, the obvious exigencies of this situation authorized the Chief by a show of authority and limited physical force to temporarily seize the defendant and restrain his freedom of movement by placing him in the back seat of the cruiser until the situation stabilized and he could determine if a full custodial arrest and further detention were necessary. We believe the seizure of the defendant and temporarily placing him in the back of the police cruiser was a legitimate option available to Chief Palumbo and was appropriate action for him to take under the circumstances. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. pp. 20-27, 88 S. Ct. 1868.
Finally, the Chief had the right to seize and conduct a limited search of the defendant immediately upon apprehending him, and, we believe, this right continued to exist, at least while the Chief was in active pursuit of defendant's companion or while other exigent circumstances made an immediate search impossible. Surely, when the Chief observed the defendant actually going for something concealed under his jacket, he was justified in concluding that he was dealing with someone who was presently armed and dangerous, and could conduct a limited search of the defendant for offensive weapons. We believe that the search conducted in this case was fully justified under the facts as they were known by Chief Palumbo and he acted reasonably under the circumstances. Cf. United States v. Owens, 472 F.2d 780 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ragsdale, 470 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Edwards, 469 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1972).
The defendant's motion will be denied. An appropriate order will be entered.
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