business tests. In this particular case, however, commitments for this mortgage did nothing to facilitate the flow of cash and capital into Pennsylvania for improvements or for purchase of Pennsylvania real estate. Rather, the purpose of this commitment was to export cash and capital from Pennsylvania for the construction of a large commercial facility in Birmingham, Alabama.
There is another control which must be considered under Act 290 as contained in Section 1928(b) wherein it is provided: "All provisions of a statute of the classes hereafter enumerated shall be strictly construed . . . (7) provisions decreasing the jurisdiction of a court of record".
We have already held that the jurisdiction of this court attaches under 42 P.S. § 8309(a) and (b) and the question is whether the jurisdiction is cut off by virtue of the exceptions in 8309(c). The section of the Statutory Construction Act above quoted is declaratory of the long existing Pennsylvania law on this subject. See Antonelli v. Xenakis, 363 Pa. 375, 69 A.2d 102 (1950).
As the Exception now stands in the Act of November 15, 1972, effective February 13, 1973, it appears to be limited to acquisition of real estate and mortgages and other liens and personal property in Pennsylvania. These third party defendants were not engaged in acquiring any real estate or mortgages thereon in Pennsylvania in making their contracts and commitment to the original defendant First Federal Savings and Loan of Erie. Rather, they were engaged in an ordinary contractual matter with the original defendant and since it appears that some of these activities looking to the making of such commitments and the making thereof occurred in Pennsylvania through correspondence, telephone calls and other negotiations, we should protect this Pennsylvania financial institution on its rights, if any, against the third party defendants by requiring all these related controversies to be adjudicated in one suit and not require First Federal in the event of a judgment against it to proceed with suits in Oklahoma and New York City with varying possible results.
It will be noted that there is a paucity of authority with respect to 15 P.S. § 2011(D) and, of course, none at all with respect to 42 P.S. § 8309(c), the present exception with which we are now dealing. Section 2011(D) was considered by Judge Dumbauld of this court in Robinson v. Shearer & Sons, Inc., Civil Action No. 68-130 whose decision on this particular point was affirmed by the Third Circuit in Robinson v. Shearer & Sons, Inc., 429 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1970) reversing the lower court on other grounds. The Robinson case involved the purchase of personal property in Pennsylvania and the circuit indicated that the purchase and receipt of the barges in question in Pennsylvania without more was within the quoted exception in the Pennsylvania statute and therefore personal jurisdiction of the defendant was not obtained. Again, in Sampson-Miller Associated Companies v. Washington Homes, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 739 (W.D. Pa. 1969), Judge Weber of this court referred to 2011(D) and upheld service on a foreign corporation engaged in activities similar to those of third party defendants in this case. Neither of these cases dealt with a situation such as we have here which does not involve the purchase and receipt of real or personal property but involves a breach of contract a part of which at least occurred in Pennsylvania. It will also be observed that these cases were all decided before the present Long Arm Statute was passed, with the deletion from 2011(D) as heretofore noted. For this reason, we do not consider them authority in this case.
We will therefore deny the motions to dismiss.
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