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RAITPORT v. GMC

November 2, 1973

Eli RAITPORT
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and Chrysler Corporation


Newcomer, District Judge.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: NEWCOMER

NEWCOMER, District Judge.

 Presently before the Court is the above captioned plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. On September 13, 1973, the plaintiff, acting in propria persona, filed a "COMPLAINT IN EQUITY, MALEFEASANCE (sic) AND LAW" in this Court against General Motors Corporation and Chrysler Corporation. The essence of the complaint is that the plaintiff has been engaged since 1967 in the development of "switches for use in cars"; that the plaintiff's "working prototypes" are "superior in safety and substantially more economical than the presently used switches for said purposes by the said defendant"; that the plaintiff offered to sell his switches to the defendants, which offer defendants declined allegedly because (a) "defendants are not interested to reduce the cost of cars in clearly identifiable manner"; (b) "because a company with good automotive engineering abilities might some day develop into a competitor"; (c) "defendants by policy are not helping and not encouraging any new starting companies"; and (d) defendants "are not interested in making cars safer, than what is required by government regulation . . ."; that defendants "promote the idea with the public that they are vigorously exploring and persuing (sic) any idea which might reduce the cost of their products and/or improve safety", and "are encouraging and helping new engineering companies to enter the automotive field" and that, upon the basis of the foregoing, plaintiff devoted his efforts "to develop said switches, with the expectation to manufacture and supply said switches to said defendants."

 The plaintiff's complaint then alleges that the foregoing facts constitute a violation of

 
(a) the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, because defendants "deprive the public of their right to obtain the maximum amount of goods and services in exchange for their labor and possessions";
 
(b) the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985, (3) because "defendants conspired to restrict the said plaintiff to freely enjoy and practice his trade"; and
 
(c) the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2, because "defendants restrict the said plaintiff from entering into automotive engineering field . . .".

 The complaint asks for damages of $30,000,000. The complaint does not seek equitable relief.

 The Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction requests that the defendants be enjoined from:

 
(a) raising prices without proof that cost reduction opportunities have been put into effect;
 
(b) discriminating against new companies; and
 
(c) from considering issues other than merits of quality, price, capability and citizenship, when so required by law, in selecting suppliers.

 The Court finds that the plaintiff has not made the requisite showing to meet the heavy burden required of a litigant seeking preliminary injunctive relief. It is clear that:

 
(1) the plaintiff has not demonstrated any legal wrong, either by way of commission or omission, on the part of General ...

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