were not required; they have thus stated a judicially cognizable claim.
(g) Plaintiffs claim that defendants failed to insure conformity of the Project to the Community and Regional Plans, that defendants permitted acceptance of non-public contributions, and that defendants failed to provide adequate relocation.
Plaintiffs have based their claims on 42 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. Defendants have not mentioned these claims in their motion to dismiss. The claims will therefore stand.
(h) Plaintiffs claim that defendants failed to follow required procedures for amendments.
Plaintiffs' complaint does not state that HUD or RA failed to follow required procedures in approving Fox and Posel Plan Two. Plaintiffs' Opposition Brief to defendants' Motion to Dismiss states that the complaint "inadvertently" omitted to allege this violation, but asserts that the complaint sets forth, in its discussion of the other claims, the facts and the law upon which the claim is based.
The Court is faced here with a literal failure to state a claim. It would be unfair to defendants to make them infer all claims that could possibly arise from the law or facts set forth in the complaint. The proper means of raising claims that have inadvertently not been raised in the complaint is an amended complaint, not a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs' claim will therefore be dismissed.
(i) Plaintiffs claim that defendants have failed to expedite the completion of the Project.
Plaintiffs have not cited any statute or decision which imposes a duty upon defendants to expeditiously complete an urban renewal project, nor has the Court found any. Plaintiffs' claim will, therefore, be dismissed.
III. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs state that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over their claims by reason of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("federal question" jurisdiction), § 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (mandamus jurisdiction), and 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act).
(a) Federal Question Jurisdiction.
Defendants challenge plaintiffs' reliance on § 1331 as a grounds for jurisdiction, declaring that plaintiffs have failed to meet that statute's $10,000 amount in controversy requirement. Ordinarily the amount the plaintiff pled in his complaint controls. Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). To this general principle is added the consideration that the injuries plaintiffs have claimed are predominantly injuries to their social, cultural, and environmental surroundings. (Although the injuries claimed from defendants' violations of the Housing Act center upon the threat that plaintiffs' homes will be demolished, plaintiffs have also declared that defendants' alleged violations of the Housing Act will deprive them of their present social and cultural environment). Faced with such injuries, whose economic value is often hard to measure, the Court is reluctant to find that plaintiffs have not met the jurisdictional amount. Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
Defendants cite numerous cases for the proposition that plaintiffs in a class action cannot aggregate their claims for the purposes of meeting the jurisdictional amount. However, plaintiffs have not attempted to aggregate their injuries in the complaint, so that defendants' arguments are irrelevant. We construe plaintiffs' complaint to allege that each and every member of the class has suffered damages in excess of $10,000, and we accept this contention, at this stage, as true.
(b) Mandamus Jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction under § 1361 is proper when the administrative action sought to be compelled -- or restrained -- is essentially ministerial rather than discretionary. In other words, if the action is clearly compelled by law, rather than being mandated by broad, general statutory language which, in effect, leaves the action within the agency's discretion, then such action can be mandamused. United States v. Walker, 409 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1969). The classic example of actions for which mandamus is proper are procedures which an agency must follow before it can approve or participate in certain projects. The procedures surrounding the preparation of a NEPA environmental impact statement have been held to be agency action which can be mandamused by the Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining Environment v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971). An agency is compelled to follow these procedures whenever it contemplates approving a "major federal action" which will "significantly affect the quality of the human environment." The decision as to which projects fall within the statutes is not left to the agency's discretion, but is rather a question of law for the Courts to decide. Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1971). Similarly, the Housing Act's requirements of a public hearing and local governing body approval, as implemented by HUD's regulations, are procedures which can be compelled by the Court under § 1361. Coalition for United Community Action v. Romney, 316 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
(c) Administrative Procedure Act.
Defendants urge that the Third Circuit does not recognize the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706, as independently granting jurisdiction to a Federal Court. This appears to be a correct statement of the law. Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3rd Cir. 1972), en banc, cert. granted, 410 U.S. 953, 93 S. Ct. 1420, 35 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1973); Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911, 90 S. Ct. 2200, 26 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1970), reh. denied, 400 U.S. 855, 91 S. Ct. 26, 27 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1970).
In Zimmerman, the Court, citing an earlier case, declared:
". . . There continues to be a dispute in the courts and in academic circles as to whether the Administrative Procedure Act is jurisdictional, i.e. whether the Act itself is an affirmative grant of jurisdiction to the district courts to review agency action according to its terms absent any other basis for jurisdiction. [citation omitted]. In an earlier case, however, this court characterized the A.P.A. as being 'clearly remedial and not jurisdictional' and stated that there is nothing in . . . the Act which extends the jurisdiction of either the district courts or the appellate courts to cases not otherwise within their competence." 422 F.2d at 330.