Appeal from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in case of In Re: Claim of Charles E. McCullough, Jr., No. B-113293.
Robert H. Shoop, Jr., with him Richard V. Sica and Thorp, Reed & Armstrong, for appellant.
Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, with him Israel Packel, Attorney General, for appellee.
President Judge Bowman and Judges Crumlish, Jr., Kramer, Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer, Rogers and Blatt. Opinion by Judge Mencer.
[ 10 Pa. Commw. Page 405]
This is an appeal filed by Moltrup Steel Products Co. (Moltrup) from an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) awarding compensation to Charles E. McCullough, Jr. (McCullough).
McCullough, an employee of Moltrup, had participated in a work stoppage which began October 1, 1971, and ended with the signing of a new contract on January 11, 1972. McCullough applied for unemployment compensation benefits on January 12, 1972. The Bureau of Employment Security denied benefits for the period January 12, 1972, through January 18, 1972, finding McCullough disqualified under the provisions of Section 402(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(d).
On February 9, 1972, an appeal was filed on McCullough's behalf by Fred A. Swager, president of McCullough's local union. A hearing was held; after which, the referee reversed the determination of the Bureau and awarded compensation for the period subsequent to January 12, 1972. Moltrup then appealed to the Board which affirmed the referee and this appeal followed.
[ 10 Pa. Commw. Page 406]
The only issue here is whether the Board and referee erred in determining the period for which McCullough was disqualified from receiving benefits under Section 402(d) of the Act. Initially, we must note our limited scope of review in unemployment compensation cases. Findings and decisions of the Board supported by substantial evidence, absent an error of law or a showing of fraud, must be affirmed. General Motors Corporation Page 406} Unemployment Compensation Cases, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 221, 306 A.2d 399 (1973).
Questions of credibility and the weight to be given evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, are for the Board's determination. The party victorious below is to be given the benefit of any inferences which can reasonably and logically be drawn from the evidence. See James v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 489, 296 A.2d 288 (1972).
Moltrup first argues that the determination of the Board was erroneous because it was based on a finding not supported by the evidence. This finding, made by the referee and adopted by the Board, is as follows: "[T]he undisputed testimony presented in behalf of claimant reveals that following labor disputes in 1959, 1965 and 1968, one day was required to prepare the plant for normal operations and that all employees were immediately recalled following the day after the dispute ended." (Emphasis added.) Moltrup contends that this testimony was disputed by both management and union representatives. We do not agree.
Moltrup's claim is based on the testimony of Mr. Sciarro, Union staff representative. He testified that, following strikes in 1965 and 1968, everyone was back to work within two days. Moltrup sees a contradiction here. We do not. The referee, by his use of the term "one day," actually meant one day after the day the strike ended. He specifically states this in the language we have quoted, and it is also clear from a reading of his order which awarded benefits starting January 13, 1972, two days after the strike ended on January 11, 1972. In short, Moltrup's argument ...