WEBER, District Judge.
In 1940 the Selective Service Training and Service Act gave re-employment rights to veterans, and these rights have been readopted without substantial change in the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948 and the Military Selective Service Act of 1967. [ 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 451-473]. The legislative history of the Act shows that it was intended to be remedial in scope and the courts have followed the mandate of liberal construction in order to protect the veteran. Much of the language is broad and ambiguous and it has engendered a large body of court interpretation as well as the embroidery of academic analysis and speculation in the law reviews.
With all this body of precedent it is striking to note that we have before us the first reported issue of a contested pension case. When the Cincinnati of World War II returned from Anzio or Iwo Jima to their plowshares they were more immediately concerned with questions of re-employment, promotion, vacation pay and unemployment benefits, and only now the advancing years force their eyes upon the effect of their military service on the company pension plan. We have found no decided cases on pension rights under the Act. [The 1972 consent judgments entered in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reported in 68 Lab. Cas. paras. 12,832, 12,833, 12,834 and 12,835 are not weighty precedents]. Thus we enter into the consideration of the immediate issue in the case at hand unenlightened by any wisdom of our colleagues but unencumbered by any misplaced confidence.
Frank S. Litwicki, the plaintiff, served in the military service of the United States from January 27, 1947 to June 14, 1948. He was initially employed by the defendant on January 22, 1951 and he worked continually for defendant until February 2, 1954. On February 2, 1954 he voluntarily enlisted in the military service of the United States and was given a military leave of absence by defendant. He served on active military duty until November 26, 1957, was honorably discharged and made a timely application for re-employment by defendant. He returned to defendant's employment on December 1, 1957 and has continued in defendant's employment until he terminated his employment on September 29, 1969. He thus had a continuing relationship with his employer of 18 8/12 years. However, for the purpose of calculating "continuous service" in determining pension rights in accordance with the pension agreement under which plaintiff worked, the agreement provides that:
Section 3 -- Determination of Continuous Service.